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 I can summarize my early academic career with one word: clueless. When I 
applied to college, I had no idea what I was doing. I chose Illinois State University 
because it was the only place I had visited for a full day, and the quad was beautiful. 
When I enrolled in Illinois State’s Master’s program, I was surprised to learn on my first 
day that I had to complete something called a “thesis”. Baffled and nervous, I chose a 
topic of research, and began my investigation of empathy. When I was planning to 
apply to a doctoral program, I was fortunate to overhear a professor say that for 
psychology, Michigan was the place to be, and so I applied. My stroke of good luck 
continued when I was accepted. Since then, I think I’ve become a little less clueless, 
which I owe to my mentors, the institutions that supported my research, and the friends 
and colleagues that I gained at Michigan.  
 Let me begin with Phoebe Ellsworth, my dissertation advisor. When I began to 
study empathy, I read many papers on empathy, but I happily ignored whatever 
anyone had to say about emotions in general. Four years ago, I had the good fortune of 
taking Phoebe’s class on emotion, which is where I learned about appraisal theory. 
Phoebe and I met for weeks to figure out how we could use appraisal theory to study 
vicarious emotions. These discussions turned into Chapter II.  
We also discussed how we could begin to test the theory. We decided to begin 
with appraisals of agency, who or what caused an event, and to test whether changing 
subjects’ appraisals of agency would change the vicarious emotions they felt for 
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someone. But it was a challenge to translate the abstract idea into a concrete study 
design. We spent many hours sitting together, pitching ideas, and then scrutinizing 
them until we were convinced they were a poor test of our hypothesis. Eventually, we 
came up with a mental placeholder: Someone had a prize-winning plant that they left 
with a friend while they went on vacation, but the plant died; either the friend watered 
the plant but it died anyway, or the friend failed to water the plant, but poured water 
on it the day before the owner returned; either way, the plant owner thought the plant 
died even though the friend faithfully watered the plant; but in the latter scenario, the 
subjects know that the true cause of this tragedy was the friend. The prize-winning 
plant was too ridiculous to use in an actual study, but we used it was the model for 
another idea: a clueless high school student applies to college but is rejected from every 
school; his rejections are either due to his difficult circumstances or due to the actions of 
his friend, but the student believes it was circumstances either way. This is the research 
that appears in Chapter III. 
I am grateful to Phoebe for her work on appraisal theories of emotion and for 
teaching her class on emotion, which inspired the idea for the appraisal theory of 
vicarious emotions; for taking the time to have open discussions as we refined the 
theory and the methods to test it; for insisting that we discuss goals in Chapter II, which 
became a major section of the paper that made it much better; for allowing me to drive 
the writing and then adding her stylistic flair to make the words sound more beautiful; 
and for offering not only mentorship, but friendship. 
 I also must thank Daphna Oyserman, my first advisor. From the very beginning, 
she showed interest in my ideas and valued the feedback that I offered in lab meetings. 
She taught me what good theory-building looks like, that it’s important to consider how 
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people subjectively construe things in the moment, and that we become better 
methodologists when we pay attention to the experiences of the people we study.  
 The research in Chapter IV would not have been possible without the support of 
the Biosocial Methods Collaborative and of the Research Center for Group Dynamics at 
the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research. Thanks to Rich Gonzalez, 
who serendipitously started the Biosocial Methods Collaborative around the time that I 
was proposing my dissertation, and who supported the study as one of their first 
projects. Thanks to Alicia Carmichael, who learned how to conduct electromyography 
research with me, set up the lab, helped me train and manage research assistants, 
helped with the early processing of the data, and made it possible for me to finish 
coding the videos remotely. Thanks to the Research Center for Group Dynamics for 
financially supporting the study with the Robert B. Zajonc Scholars Fund. 
 Over the past six years, I received tremendous intellectual and social support 
from my friends and colleagues among the graduate students at Michigan. Thanks to 
Steve Tompson for being the first person to extend friendship to me, and for being a 
great roommate during the year we lived together. Thanks to Dave Hauser for offering 
his insights from social cognition during the many times I distracted him in our office as 
I was developing new research ideas. Thanks to Joe Bayer, who taught me about the 
nuances of automatic psychological processes, which helped me write the introduction 
to Chapter IV. Thanks to Francisco Velasquez, who has given me wonderful memories 
of grad school trips to a lake house, to Chicago, and to a beach soccer tournament on 
Lake Michigan. Thanks to Tissyana Camacho for making our karaoke rendition of 
“Forgot About Dre” a highlight of graduate student recruitment weekends. Thanks to 
Jenn Chudy for showing me what psychologists can offer to other fields. Thanks to 
Steven Roberts for teaching me about loyalty in friendship. Thanks to Neil Lewis for his 
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insights on publishing and productivity, and for offering me a couch to sleep on during 
the past year. Thanks to Lauren Reed for teaching me about privilege, which has made 
me a more conscious and better person. 
 Finally, I thank my wife, Imah Effiong, for her support and companionship, 
especially during these last few months as I’ve been coding videos and analyzing data 
in the evenings and on weekends, and for always believing in my ability to succeed. 
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 How does an observer feel an emotion for someone else who is going through an 
emotional experience? This phenomenon is called empathy when the observer’s 
emotion is the same as or similar to the other person’s emotion, or vicarious emotions 
more generally. In this dissertation, I introduce an appraisal theory of empathy and 
other vicarious emotional experiences. According to the theory, an observer will feel a 
vicarious emotion when they evaluate, or appraise, someone else’s emotional situation. If 
the observer appraises the situation similarly to how the other person appraises it, then 
the observer will feel a similar emotion and experience empathy. If the observer 
appraises the situation differently, then the observer will feel a different emotion, or 
will have a relatively unemotional reaction. 
Chapter I introduces a central question that the theory raises: is empathy caused 
by an observer’s perception of someone else’s emotions, or by the observer’s perception 
of someone else’s situation? Chapter II reviews existing theories of empathy and 
introduces the appraisal theory of vicarious emotions. Chapter III presents empirical 
research testing whether observers’ vicarious emotions are affected by their appraisals, 
and finds that changing observers’ appraisals of who or what caused someone’s 
misfortune can make them feel vicarious anger that the other person does not feel. 
Chapter IV presents empirical research testing how observers’ vicarious responses are 
affected by others’ emotion expressions, and finds that when observers believe that 
someone’s emotion expression is not a reliable sign of their situation, they “mimic” that 
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person’s expressions less. Chapter V summarizes the work and offers directions for 
future research. 
The appraisal theory treats vicarious emotions as a part of normal emotion 







On Empathy, Perceiving Emotions, and Perceiving Situations 
 
 This work is about empathy, a phenomenon where an observer perceives 
someone else’s emotional experience and comes to feel the emotion that the other 
person feels. The central question that I raise is this: what is the proximate cause of 
empathy? If the observer feels sad when she sees someone crying, or feels happy when 
she sees someone smiling, what caused her own sadness or joy? There are two causes 
that frequently appear in scholarly treatments of empathy—first, the observer’s 
perception of a target’s emotion, and second, the observer’s perception of the target’s 
situation. 
In philosophy, these causes appear in the writing of philosophers from the 
Scottish Enlightenment, where the term “sympathy” was used to describe what I call 
“empathy”. David Hume (1739) described the nature of sympathy in his Treatise on 
Human Nature. Hume believed that when we perceive others’ emotion expressions, the 
idea of the emotion comes to mind, and if the idea becomes vivid enough, then we will 
feel the emotion: 
When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, 
and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey 
an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires 
such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and 
produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. (p. 218) 
 
In other words, Hume believed that the proximate cause of empathy was the observer’s 
perception of the target’s emotion. 
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 But 20 years later, Adam Smith, Hume’s friend, published his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759/2002), where he offered a different perspective: 
Even our sympathy with the grief or joy of another, before we are informed of 
the cause, is always extremely imperfect. General lamentations, which express 
nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a curiosity to inquire into 
his situation, along with some disposition to sympathize with him, than any 
actual sympathy that is very sensible. The first question which we ask is, What 
has befallen you? Till this be answered, though we are uneasy both from the 
vague idea of his misfortune, and still more from torturing ourselves with 
conjectures about what it may be, yet our fellow-feeling is not very considerable. 
Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as 
from that of the situation which excites it. (pp. 14-15) 
 
Smith disagreed with Hume, and thought that the proximate cause of empathy was not 
the perception of the other’s emotion, but rather the perception of the other’s situation. 
If others’ emotion expressions cause us to empathize, then it is because the expressions 
make us think the other’s situation is good or bad. 
 More than a century and a half later, the same two causes of empathy appeared 
in psychology. William McDougall (1919/2001) argued that animals, including humans, 
have emotional instincts, and that these instincts are activated when we perceive a 
similar instinct in others:  
How comes it that the instinctive behaviour of one animal directly excites similar 
behaviour on the part of his fellows?... I think the facts compel us to assume that 
in the gregarious animals each of the principal instincts has a special perceptual 
inlet (or recipient afferent part) that is adapted to receive and to elaborate the 
sense-impressions made by the expressions of the same instinct in other animals 
of the same species— that, e.g., the fear-instinct has, besides others, a special 
perceptual inlet that renders it excitable by the sound of the cry of fear, the 
instinct of pugnacity a perceptual inlet that renders it excitable by the sound of 
the roar of anger. (p. 72) 
 
McDougall agreed with Hume—the proximate cause of empathy was the perception of 
the other’s emotion. But five years later Floyd Allport (1924) argued against 
McDougall’s theory and offered a perspective that was similar to Smith’s: 
Again, most persons strive to recognize the expression by recalling specific 
situations in which such a facial response would be fitting. This last point affords 
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us an important clue: it is not the direct emotional behavior of the person, so much as 
the knowledge of the conditions affecting him that makes it possible for us to understand 
(and indeed to sympathize) with his state of mind… If we witness the anger of two 
men who are fighting, our anger is not necessarily aroused. We may instead be 
amused, frightened, or interested, according to the circumstances. If one of the 
combatants is our dearest friend, we feel anger and participate in the conflict. But 
our anger is not a ‘sympathetic anger’ aroused by the sight of our friend’s angry 
behavior. It is aroused by the enemy who is injuring our friend, and thereby 
thwarting certain of our own affections and interests. Here again it is the whole 
situation rather than the perception of an emotion in another which arouses the 
emotion in us. (pp. 234-235, emphasis original) 
 
Similar to Smith, Allport believed that the proximate cause of empathy was not the 
perception of the emotion, but the perception of the situation, and if the emotion 
expression makes us empathize, it is because “we have learned to read these 
expressions as signs that there really is something to be afraid of” (p. 235, emphasis 
original). 
 In modern psychology, newer theories have emerged that echo the ideas of 
Hume and McDougall—they emphasize that empathy is caused by the perception of 
others’ emotions. One theory is based on mimicry, and argues that an observer who 
perceives someone else’s emotion expressions will automatically imitate the expression, 
and then afferent feedback from the mimicked expression will cause the observer to feel 
the associated emotion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Hoffman, 2000). A second 
theory is based on mirror neurons, and argues that when an observer perceives 
someone else’s emotion, it automatically activates the neurons in the observer’s brain 
that underlie the firsthand experience of the emotion, which causes us the observer to 
feel the emotion (Gallese, 2003; Keysers & Gazzola, 2009). A third theory is the 
Perception-Action Model, which argues that when an observer perceives someone else’s 
emotion, it automatically activates the observer’s own representation of the emotion, 
which causes the observer to feel the emotion if the activation is strong enough 
(Preston, 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Preston & Hofelich, 2012). The observer’s 
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representation of the other’s state draws on generic representations of emotion, 
representations of the other’s situation (what it feels like to experience the situation), 
and representations of the other person (e.g., how the other has felt in the past). The 
mirror neuron and perception-action theories have inspired a great deal of research on 
empathy, particularly in social neuroscience, where researchers frequently use 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test whether the neural regions that 
are active during firsthand experiences of pain are also active when people observe 
others who are in pain (e.g., Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 
2011; Morrison, Lloyd, di Pellegrino, & Roberts, 2004; however, see also Krishnan et al., 
2016). 
 In this work, however, I will side with Smith and Allport by arguing that the role 
of emotion perception has been over-emphasized, and empathy is driven by our 
perceptions of others’ situations. I develop a theory of empathy that is rooted in modern 
psychological research on emotion, specifically, appraisal theories of emotion 
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). Appraisal theories of emotion argue that the emotions we feel depend on how we 
evaluate, or appraise, situations, and they identify specific appraisals that are most 
important for differentiating emotional experience. So far, appraisal theorists have only 
studied how people feel emotions for themselves. However, I will develop an appraisal 
theory of empathy by arguing that people can appraise others’ situations using the 
same appraisal dimensions. If an observer appraises a target’s situation similarly to how 
the target appraises it, then the observer will feel an emotion that is similar to what the 
target feels (empathy); if the observer appraises a target’s situation differently from how 
the target appraises it, then the observer will feel an emotion that is different from what 
the target feels, or will feel relatively unemotional.    
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 In Chapter II, I present an overview of the appraisal theory of empathy and other 
vicarious emotional experiences. I review other psychological theories of empathy and 
discuss their limitations. Then I discuss how the appraisal theory addresses these 
limitations. 
 In Chapter III, I present the first empirical research to test the theory. In this 
research, I tested whether changing an observer’s appraisals of a target’s situation can 
lead the observer to feel a vicarious emotion that the target does not feel, a phenomenon 
that is not explained well by other theories of empathy. Specifically, I tested whether 
changing subjects’ appraisals of agency for a target’s misfortune could lead them to feel 
vicarious anger that the target did not feel.  
 In Chapter IV, I present an empirical investigation of whether people use targets’ 
emotion expressions to inform their appraisals of the targets’ situations, and how this 
affects their vicarious emotions. In this research, I tested an idea from Adam Smith and 
Floyd Allport—that if others’ emotion expressions cause us to empathize, it is because 
we take them as a sign that something good or bad has happened to the other person. 
Specifically, I presented subjects with a target whose emotion expressions were not a 
reliable sign that something good happened to them, and tested whether this would 
attenuate subjects’ vicarious responses to the target’s emotion expressions. 
 Finally, in Chapter V, I will summarize the present work, discuss how it fits with 
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An Appraisal Theory of Empathy and Other Vicarious Emotional Experiences 
Adapted from Wondra, J. D., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2015). An appraisal theory of empathy and other vicarious emotional experiences. 
Psychological Review, 122, 411-428. doi: 10.1037/a0039252 
 
 We feel sad when a crying friend’s father has passed away. We feel embarrassed 
for our colleague when he blunders and blushes. We feel joy for our smiling friend 
when she succeeds. Empathy, feeling what another person feels, is pervasive, and it is a 
problem. 
Empathy is a problem because it defies our assumption that emotions are about 
our own personal goals (Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Moors, 2010; C. A. Smith, Haynes, 
Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). Indeed, empathic emotions are described as more appropriate 
for someone else’s situation than for our own (Hoffman, 2000; Preston & de Waal, 2002). 
Yet just as we feel emotions when we see a great work of art or step outside on a sunny 
day, we feel emotions for others when our personal goals are not involved.  
Emotion and empathy have been studied in isolation from each other. Theories 
of emotion neglect empathic emotions, and theories of empathy are full of special 
explanations for empathic emotions that are different from explanations for personal 
emotions. Nevertheless, empathic emotions are real emotions. They strike us quickly 
and redirect our attention just as any other emotion does and there is no reason to think 
that they are different from normal emotion processes. Bringing theories of empathy 
and emotion together explicitly can advance our understanding of both.  
We begin with a discussion of what is usually meant by empathy. Then we 
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review and critically examine current theories of empathy. Finally, we present a theory 
of empathy based on appraisal theories of emotion.  
What is Empathy? 
We feel emotions about a wide variety of things. Sometimes we feel emotions 
because something happens to us. These are firsthand emotions. At other times we feel 
emotions because something happens to someone else. These are vicarious emotions. In 
some vicarious emotional experiences, we feel the same emotion that the other person 
feels. These experiences, when we feel an emotion because something happens to 
someone else and it is the same emotion that they feel, we call empathy.  
The term empathy is used haphazardly to refer to different phenomena that are 
related to this kind of emotion sharing, which has led one prominent empathy 
researcher to suggest abandoning the term “empathy” altogether (Decety & Cowell, 
2014a; Decety & Cowell,2014b). We suspect part of the problem is that the term 
empathy is associated with at least three valued outcomes—caring for others, 
understanding others, and validating others’ emotions. Many processes that produce 
these outcomes, even if they are not the same, are considered to be empathic in some 
way. If the same process fails to produce these outcomes, it is rejected as not empathic. 
For example, perspective taking is treated as a part of empathy when it leads to emotion 
sharing or caring for others (e.g., Decety, 2011; Zaki, 2014). Yet if perspective taking is a 
part of empathy, then it should be considered empathic both when it leads to altruistic 
behavior (Toi & Batson, 1982) and when it leads to selfish behavior (Epley, Caruso, & 
Bazerman, 2006).1 
                                                             
1 Basch (1983, p. 122) makes a similar point about the problem with linking empathy to 
valued outcomes, but he preferred to use the term empathy to describe a process of 
understanding others rather than feeling what they feel. 
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The essence of empathy, agreed upon by most empathy researchers, is feeling 
what another person feels because something happens to them, and that is what we 
mean by empathy in our discussions. This conceptualization of empathy is equivalent 
to affective resonance/experience sharing in multi-component models of empathy, but 
it does not include other processes that some empathy theorists believe contribute to 
emotion sharing, such as perspective taking, self-regulation, and mind perception 
(Decety, 2011; Zaki, 2014). Nor does it require empathy to involve feelings of concern 
for another person, which is called compassion or sympathy (de Vignemont & Singer, 
2006; Decety, 2011; Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991; Singer & Lamm, 2009). 
Although you can feel sad with someone else who is sad (empathy) and also feel 
concern (compassion), you can also feel happy with someone who is happy (empathy) 
and feel no concern because nothing bad has happened. Our use of the term empathy 
does not require understanding another’s internal states, which is sometimes called 
cognitive empathy (Cox et al., 2012; Hodges & Myers, 2007; Nummenmaa, Hirvonen, 
Parkkola, & Hietanen, 2008; Preston et al., 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Saxe, 2006; 
Schnell, Bluschke, Konradt, & Walter, 2010; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 
2009), or validating another’s emotions. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith 
(1759/2002) wrote about feeling what others feel because he thought it was an 
important part of how we approve of their emotions. We think that this is an interesting 
and understudied topic, but we do not discuss it.  
Emotion Theory and Empathy Theory are Strangers to Each Other 
Emotion theories have not said much about emotions for others, though there 
have been some social approaches to emotion (e.g., Butler, 2011; Mackie, E. R. Smith, & 
Ray, 2008; Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, 2011; Parkinson, Phiri, & Simons, 2012; 
E. R. Smith, 1993; E. R. Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007; van Kleef, 2009; van Kleef, van 
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Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011). These approaches emphasize that other people 
influence our firsthand emotions. Social appraisal theory argues that people use others’ 
emotions to evaluate their own situations (Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, 2011; 
see also Schachter, 1959). For example, infants look to their mothers’ emotional 
reactions to decide whether to cross a visual cliff (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 
1985) and adults look at others' emotional reactions to decide how much of a risk to take 
(Parkinson et al., 2012). Intergroup emotion theory argues that important groups that 
people belong to change their emotions because people stereotype how they should feel 
to fit the group stereotype and because they adopt group goals as personal goals 
(Mackie et al., 2008; E. R. Smith, 1993; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). These theories address 
how our own emotions are affected by the emotions of others. They do not address our 
capacity to feel emotions for others when we are not in the same situation or when we 
are not members of the same group.  
Empathy theories do discuss our capacity to feel emotions for others, but they 
treat empathy as something special and they do not relate empathy to the processes that 
drive firsthand emotional experiences. Also, current theories of empathy focus on 
situations where an observer2 feels the same emotion as a target, and they do not 
consider other vicarious emotional experiences, as though matching makes empathy a 
separate phenomenon in its own right.3 The theories explain how an observer can feel 
sad for a target who feels sad, but not how an observer can feel angry for a target who 
                                                             
2 Throughout the paper we call the person who empathizes the “observer” and the 
person with whom the observer empathizes the “target”.  
3 Empathic emotions are grouped with vicarious pain and vicarious motor action more 
often than they are grouped with firsthand emotions, as though their vicarious quality 
is more important than their emotional quality (Gallese et al., 2004; Keysers & Gazzola, 
2009; but see Blair, 2005). 
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feels sad. Yet are vicarious emotions that match the target’s feelings and those that do 
not match so different?  
Imagine that your colleague uses the bathroom before he gives a conference talk. 
As he walks to the stage, you notice that a long strand of toilet paper is stuck to his foot. 
Everyone in the audience can see it. Your colleague might notice the toilet paper and 
blush, or he might fail to notice it and show no sign of embarrassment. Either way you 
can feel embarrassed for him (Krach et al., 2011). In the first case, you experience 
empathy because you feel the same as your colleague, and in the second case you do 
not because you feel something different. Between the two scenarios, what has changed 
about the cause or the nature of your own emotional experience? This point is 
important and we will return to it later, but first we review current theories of empathy.  
Current Theories of Empathy 
Hoffman’s Theory of Moral Development  
Psychological research on empathy through the 20th century is summarized well 
in the writing of the developmental psychologist Martin L. Hoffman (2000), whose 
theory of moral development has provided the most comprehensive view of empathy. 
Hoffman focuses on empathic distress in his writing. His theory includes five 
mechanisms to explain how an observer becomes distressed when observing a target’s 
distress. The five mechanisms are (a) mimicry, (b) classical conditioning, (c) direct 
association, (d) mediated association, and (e) role-taking.  
Mimicry, classical conditioning, and direct association. In Hoffman’s (2000) 
first three mechanisms, the observer perceives the target’s emotional experience 
directly. These mechanisms are considered “primitive, automatic, and... involuntary” 
(p. 36).  
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Mimicry. Empathy through mimicry involves a two-stage process. First, the 
observer automatically imitates the target’s emotional facial, postural, or vocal 
expressions. Second, afferent feedback from the imitated expression causes the 
associated emotional state in the observer. So if you see a stray dog attack someone who 
looks scared, you automatically imitate the other person's expression of fear. Your own 
expression of fear causes you to feel scared too. This imitation and feedback process of 
mimicry is what Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson (1994) call “primitive emotional 
contagion.”4 The feedback stage is equivalent to a strong version of the facial feedback 
hypothesis, in which making an emotional face produces a subjective feeling of the 
emotion (Laird, 1974; Laird & Lacasse, 2014; Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989).  
Classical conditioning. Classical conditioning of emotions begins with situations 
that make us feel emotional even if we have never experienced them before. For 
example, you might feel scared the first time a dog bites you. After we experience the 
intrinsically emotional situation, we learn that certain cues are a sign that it is about to 
happen again. As a result, we start to feel emotional when we perceive those cues. For 
example, you might learn that dogs growl before they bite and so you begin to feel 
scared when you hear a dog growl. In the language of classical conditioning, the dog 
bite is an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) that causes you to feel scared as an 
unconditioned response (UCR); the dog growl is the neutral stimulus (NS) that is paired 
with the dog bite often enough to become a conditioned stimulus (CS) that causes you 
to feel scared as a conditioned response (CR). What does this have to do with empathy? 
The idea is that features of others’ emotional experiences can become the cues that 
                                                             
4 Some researchers distinguish emotional contagion from empathy by arguing that 
empathy requires self-other distinction, whereas emotional contagion does not. We 
address self-other distinction later in the paper. 
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trigger a conditioned emotional response.  
In one version of classically conditioned empathy (Hoffman, 2000), during 
conditioning we experience emotional situations (UCS’s) with others who are 
expressing emotions (NS’s). This pairing of the situation and others’ emotional 
expressions causes the emotional expressions to become the cues (CS’s) that a similar 
situation is about to occur. As a result, others’ emotional expressions cause us to feel 
emotions (CRs), which we experience as empathy. For example, you might see a stray 
dog attack another person who looks scared (NS) right before the same dog attacks you 
(UCS) and you feel afraid (UCR). In the future when you see others’ fear expressions 
(CS), you will feel afraid again (CR).  
In a second version of classically conditioned empathy (Humphrey, 1922), the 
conditioned stimuli are not others’ emotional expressions, but instead they are 
perceived features of the situation. For example, you might hear a stray dog growl (NS) 
right before it attacks you (UCS) and you feel afraid (UCR). In the future when you hear 
a dog growl before it attacks someone else (CS), you will feel afraid (CR). In the first 
version the target’s emotional expression causes empathic emotions, whereas in the 
second version features of the target’s emotional situation cause empathic emotions.  
Direct association. With direct association, when the observer sees the target’s 
emotional expression or situation, it reminds the observer of her own past emotional 
experiences. Then the observer feels the emotions that she felt during the original 
experiences. For example, if you see a stray dog attack another person, then you might 
remember a time when an animal attacked you. You re-experience the original fear 
from the memory.  
Mediated association and role-taking. In contrast to the first three mechanisms, 
Hoffman’s fourth and fifth mechanisms do not require direct perception of the target’s 
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emotional experience. For this reason, they are considered to involve more advanced 
cognitive abilities.  
Mediated association. With mediated association, observers learn about targets’ 
emotional experiences through words. Then observers imagine the targets’ emotional 
expressions and mimic them, remember their own past experiences and feel the 
emotions from the memories, or both. Mediated association is similar to mimicry or 
direct association but the observer does not perceive the target’s experience directly. For 
example, if someone else tells you that a dog attacked him earlier in the day, then you 
might remember a time when a dog attacked you and feel afraid because of the 
memory.  
Role-taking. Role-taking occurs when observers either imagine themselves in the 
target’s situation or imagine how the target feels. As with mediated association, 
observers might mimic imagined emotional expressions or might feel emotions by 
using their own emotional memories to imagine the target’s situation. Nevertheless, 
role-taking is more effortful than mediated association. Role-taking involves active 
attempts to understand a target by bringing emotional memories or imagined emotional 
expressions to mind, whereas mediated association involves a more automatic 
activation of emotional memories or imagery. For example, if you learn that someone 
else was attacked by a dog, then you might try to actively imagine how she felt, recall a 
time when a dog attacked you, and feel afraid from the memory.  
Hoffman discusses mimicry, direct association, mediated association, and role-
taking as separate mechanisms for empathy even though they largely overlap. For all of 
them, the observer’s vicarious emotional experience comes from imitating emotional 
expressions or recalling emotional memories. The differences are whether the observer 
must observe the target’s emotion or situation directly (mimicry and direct association) 
 16 
or can infer them indirectly (mediated association and role-taking) and whether the 
observer puts in some effort to empathize (role-taking) or not (the other four).  
In his description of role-taking, Hoffman (2000) also states that observers can 
imagine the target’s emotional situation so vividly that they feel the same emotion. This 
is the only case in which Hoffman says that empathy might not rely on prior experience 
(conditioning history or own emotional memories) or a context-free biological 
mechanism (mimicry) and it begins to sound like normal emotional experience. If an 
observer can feel the emotion by vividly imagining the target’s situation, then why 
couldn’t the observer feel the emotion by directly perceiving the target’s situation? Are 
the memory-based and mimicry mechanisms necessary for empathy?
Mirror Neurons and the Perception-Action Model  
Since the 2000s, empathy research has mostly become brain research. The 
discovery of mirror neurons in the 1990s was a major driving force that moved 
contemporary empathy research into the domain of neuroscience. Mirror neurons 
discharge during both the firsthand performance and the secondhand observation of 
goal-oriented action. These neurons were first discovered in the F5 region of the 
premotor cortex in macaque monkeys (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). For example, mirror 
neurons discharged both when a monkey grasped food and also when it watched an 
experimenter grasp food. This was an important breakthrough because it suggested a 
mechanism by which two seemingly different systems, the perceptual system and the 
motor system, could be linked. Some researchers have argued that mirror neurons help 
organisms understand and imitate others’ actions (Gallese, 2003; Gallese, Keysers, & 
Rizzolatti, 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), although the 
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role of mirror neurons in understanding action has been a topic of some debate (Gallese, 
Gernsbacher, Heyes, Hickok, & Iacoboni, 2011; Hickok, 2009; Jacob, 2008; Kosonogov, 
2012).  
Some have argued that mirror neurons are responsible for all vicarious 
experiences, including vicarious experiences of action, sensation, and emotion (Gallese, 
2003; Gallese et al., 2004; Iacoboni, 2009; Keysers & Gazzola, 2009). For example, 
Gallese’s “shared manifold hypothesis,” proposes that, within a mirror neuron 
framework, empathy should “accommodate and account for all different aspects of 
expressive behavior... to unify under the same account the multiple aspects and possible 
levels of description of intersubjective relations” (Gallese, 2003, pp. 176-177). The idea is 
that whenever an observer perceives a target’s emotion, the neurons of the observer that 
are responsible for the firsthand experience of that emotion automatically discharge. As 
a result, the observer feels the emotion and experiences empathy. For example, if you 
see a stray dog attack another person and you perceive that the person is scared, then 
the neurons that are involved in your own experiences of fear automatically discharge 
and you feel scared too. As with understanding action, the role of mirror neurons in 
empathy has been a topic of debate (Baird, Scheffer, & Wilson, 2011; Blair, 2011; Decety, 
2010; Gallese et al., 2011).  
Similar to the mirror neuron account is Preston and de Waal’s (2002) perception-
action model of empathy (see also Preston, 2007). Like mirror neurons, perception-
action models were originally developed to explain how perceptual information turns 
into motor action. According to the common-coding account (Prinz, 1997), perception 
and action share some underlying representation or process so that perceptual 
information automatically prepares action without the need for any intervening 
cognitive process. Preston and de Waal applied the same idea to empathy and proposed 
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that “attended perception of the [target’s] state automatically activates the [observer’s] 
representations of the state, situation, and [target], and... activation of these 
representations automatically primes or generates the associated autonomic and 
somatic responses, unless inhibited” (p. 4). These emotional representations might 
involve mirror neurons, but mirror neurons are not required. The representations can 
have other components such as episodic memories or autonomic arousal. So if you see a 
stray dog attack another person who looks scared, then the neurons, physiological 
changes, and episodic memories that are part of your representation of fear 
automatically activate and cause you to feel scared too.  
The mirror neuron and perception-action theories of empathy are something like 
a combination of Hoffman’s mimicry and association mechanisms. Instead of 
mimicking bodily expressions of emotion, mirror neurons skip over the body and 
mimic brain activity. Instead of the perception of a target’s state or situation activating 
the observer’s emotional memories, the perception of the target’s state activates the 
observer’s representation of the same state (which might include emotional memories).  
The majority of the neuroscientific experiments on empathy examine vicarious 
experiences of physical pain rather than vicarious experiences of emotion (e.g., Fan & 
Han, 2008; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007a; Lamm, 
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2009; Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2007b; Perry, Bentin, 
Bartal, Lamm, & Decety, 2010). For example, in one fMRI study (Jackson et al., 2005), 
subjects had more activity in two brain regions that are active during firsthand 
experiences of pain, the anterior insula (AI) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
when they viewed photographs of hands and feet in painful situations (e.g., being cut 
with a knife) than when they viewed photographs of hands and feet in non-painful 
situations (e.g., next to a knife). Activity in the AI or ACC has also been found for 
 19 
firsthand and vicarious disgust (Phillips et al., 1997; Wicker et al., 2003) and firsthand 
and vicarious social exclusion (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Masten, 
Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011; Meyer et al., 2013). Research on neural overlap for 
firsthand and empathic experiences of common emotions such as happiness, sadness, 
embarrassment, and anger is more scarce, though some studies have examined the AI 
and ACC as components of an automatic empathy system (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, 
& Dolan, 1999; Bruneau, Pluta, & Saxe, 2012; de Greck et al., 2012; Krach et al., 2011; 
Morelli & Lieberman, 2013). Although research finding neural overlap for firsthand and 
vicarious experiences of emotions would be consistent with mirror neuron and 
perception-action theories of empathy, we do not think it would rule out other theories 
because they predict the same thing.  
The original mirror neuron and common-coding approaches to perceptual 
information and motor action were exciting because they contradicted the common 
belief that perception and action involve separate systems that can only communicate 
through some intervening process. Watching someone reach for a doorknob does not 
require you to move; reaching to open a door does. Even in the case of vicarious 
physical pain, watching someone stub her toe does not require your foot to touch the 
wall; stubbing your own toe does. The problem in perception and action has been how 
to connect two apparently different systems. If there are overlapping representations for 
perception and motor action, then the idea that the two systems are separate comes into 
question. The evidence supports a common-coding theory over a separate 
representations theory.  
Mirror neuron and common-coding approaches are less remarkable when they 
are applied to empathy. All prior theories of empathy assume that the same sorrow, joy, 
or embarrassment is active during firsthand and empathic experiences. No one thought 
 20 
that empathic emotions involved separate representations, so there was no comparable 
underlying assumption for the newer theories to contradict. The problem in empathy 
has been how a single emotion is triggered by different kinds of events—one’s own 
experiences and others’ experiences—and not how to connect two different systems for 
firsthand and empathic emotions. Mirror neuron and perception-action theories of 
empathy argue for common representations of firsthand and empathic emotions, but so 
do all other theories of empathy. If there are overlapping representations, whether they 
involve neural activity or something else, then this is not evidence that favors mirror 
neuron or perception-action theories of empathy over other theories. It is evidence that 
empathy exists.  
Critical Review of Current Theories of Empathy 
We assume that the empirical evidence makes the best case for each empathy 
mechanism and discuss how they answer two general questions:  
1) How does an observer feel the same emotion that a target is feeling when the 
observer is not in the same situation?  
2) When does an observer’s emotional response to a target’s emotional 
experience not match what the target is feeling?  
Theories of empathy are designed to answer the first question—how does 
empathy happen? They are not designed to answer the second question—when does 
empathy not happen, whether this involves an unemotional response or an emotional 
response that does not match what the target feels? Yet we believe that the second 
question is important,and intimately related to the first. When an observer does not feel 
what a target feels it is sometimes called an “empathy failure” (Cikara, Bruneau, & 
Saxe, 2011). The idea of “empathy failures” implies that matching is the default 
outcome of an empathy-specific process. Instead, the same process might produce both 
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matching and non-matching, empathic and non-empathic, vicarious emotions. 
Matching might not be an inherent feature of the process and empathy might not be 
very different from other vicarious emotional experiences.  
Consider our emotional reactions to horror films. You can feel scared for 
characters who know that a murderer is stalking them in their home, but you can also 
feel scared for characters who are clueless about the murderer’s presence. Is the cause of 
your fear very different in these two cases? Does a new empathy-generating process 
take over from some other process once the clueless characters notice the murderer and 
become scared too?  
The scenario in which the characters feel scared counts as empathy because you 
feel what they feel. The other scenario does not count as empathy because you do not 
feel what they feel. One way to resolve the discrepancy is to claim that different 
processes produce matching and non-matching vicarious emotions. This argument 
would substantially limit the explanatory value of the empathy-generating process and 
it seems unlikely. A better option is to seek a process that can explain both scenarios.
Explaining Emotion Matching  
Each of the seven current processes proposed for empathy can explain emotion 
matching to some extent. Their limits with respect to emotion matching are based on 
whether or not they require the observer to (1) have some relevant past experience or 
(2) perceive the target’s emotional state or situation directly.  
Necessity of the observer’s past experience. If empathy depends on the 
observer’s past experience, then an observer can only feel vicarious emotions for events 
like those that he or she has experienced. Classical conditioning, direct and indirect 
association, role-taking, and the perception-action model rely on the observer’s past 
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experience. With classical conditioning, the observer must have a conditioning history 
for any empathic emotion. With direct association and indirect association, the observer 
must have relevant emotional memories that can come to mind. The same applies to 
role-taking unless the observer mimics imagined emotional expressions of the target. 
The perception-action model is similar, though the observer’s representation of the 
target’s state could be activated without a specific emotional memory if the observer 
has experienced that state in the past. In contrast, mimicry and mirror neurons do not 
rely on the observer’s past experience. The observer can mimic or mirror any expressed 
emotion.  
Past experience most likely contributes to empathy when it comes to mind. 
Indeed, emotion researchers sometimes ask subjects to recall previous emotional 
experiences to make them feel specific emotions (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001). 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that it is necessary for empathy. Otherwise children 
wouldn’t be frightened by ghost stories involving other boys and girls and it would be 
hard to explain the power of literature in general. You would find it dull to hear about 
how a friend proposed to the love of his life if you have never been engaged. The 
importance of the observer’s past experiences for many of the empathy mechanisms 
highlights the disconnection between theories of empathy and theories of emotion. The 
observer’s emotional experiences must begin somewhere. Firsthand emotions do not 
require past experience, so why should vicarious emotions require it? Why should 
vicarious emotions not begin with the same process as any other emotion?  
Direct or indirect perception. All theories of empathy require the observer to 
perceive the target’s emotional state or situation. Some of the processes require the 
observer to view the target’s emotional expression or situation directly (direct 
perception) and others allow the observer to imagine the target’s emotional expression 
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or situation or to learn about them through language (indirect perception). Classical 
conditioning, mimicry, and mirror neurons require direct perception. With classical 
conditioning, conditioned emotional responses only occur when the learned cues (the 
conditioned stimuli) are present. With mimicry and mirror neurons, the observer must 
see the target to imitate or neurally match the target (unless the observer can mimic or 
mirror expressions that she imagines). By definition, direct association means that the 
observer’s direct perception of the target’s state or situation activates associated 
emotional memories. In contrast, mediated association and role-taking allow indirect 
perception through language or imagination. The perception-action model allows both 
direct perception and indirect perception of another’s state (Preston, 2007). The observer 
can perceive the target’s state by directly observing behavior such as facial expressions, 
by listening to the target say “I feel sad,” by indirectly inferring the target’s state from 
assumptions about the target’s situation (e.g., “needles are painful,” Y. Cheng et al., 
2007), or by imagining the target’s emotional state.  
No process that requires direct perception of a target’s emotional state or 
expression can explain how an observer can feel something that the target does not feel 
(unless one wants to argue that all non-matching vicarious emotions are based on 
incorrect perceptions of what the target feels). However, processes that allow the 
perception of a target’s situation rather than the target’s state to cause the empathic 
emotions can begin to explain non-matching emotional responses.
Explaining Non-Matching  
Non-matching can mean one of two things. First, it can mean that the observer 
reacts unemotionally to a target’s emotional experience. Here the question is whether 
the empathy- generating mechanism was not operating or it was operating but it 
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produced an unemotional state. Current empathy theories handle these “empathy 
failures” rather well. Second, it can mean that an observer feels something on behalf of 
the target that the target does not feel, such as feeling embarrassed for someone who 
shows no sign of embarrassment. In this case the question is whether the empathy-
generating mechanism can produce vicarious emotions that differ from the target’s 
emotions. This is where current empathy theories lose their explanatory power.  
Unemotional observer. Unemotional observer reactions pose a challenge to any 
claim that empathy happens automatically. If the process is automatic, then why do we 
not empathize with everyone all of the time?  
One kind of explanation offered by empathy theorists is that empathy occurs 
automatically, but it requires some minimal conditions. One condition that applies to 
every mechanism is that the observer must attend to the target’s state or situation. If the 
observer never notices the target, or intentionally diverts attention away from the 
target, then there will be no empathy (Preston, 2007). For example, people might 
empathize with ingroup members more than with outgroup members (Molenberghs, 
2013) because they attend more to others with whom they are interdependent (Preston, 
2007). Another condition, as discussed previously, is that all of the mechanisms aside 
from mimicry and mirror neurons require the observer to have some past experience 
that is relevant to the target’s state or situation. If the observer lacks relevant experience, 
then these processes cannot operate and there will be no empathy.  
A second kind of explanation is that empathy occurs automatically, but the 
observer can regulate and inhibit it. For example, physicians and acupuncture 
practitioners do not show empathic neural responses to needle pricks (Y. Cheng et al., 
2007; Decety, Yang, & Cheng, 2010). Presumably, physicians and acupuncture 
practitioners have more experience than others with regulating their vicarious pain 
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responses because they must inhibit their empathic reactions to their patients. There are 
two perspectives on when regulation occurs: the “late appraisal model” and the “early 
appraisal model” (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006).5 A late appraisal model means that an 
observer begins to automatically match a target’s emotion, but then can regulate and 
inhibit the empathic emotion. This seems to be the dominant perspective in empathy 
research (e.g., Decety et al., 2010; Eisenberg et al., 1994; Fan & Han, 2008). In contrast, an 
early appraisal model means that the way an observer initially interprets a target’s 
situation determines whether neural matching ever begins. A late appraisal model can 
help automatic matching theories explain why an observer would feel nothing for a 
target. Even if the observer is attentive and has relevant experience, the observer might 
inhibit the empathic emotion after matching begins. But a late appraisal model cannot 
explain why an observer would feel something for a target who does not seem to feel 
anything, or who seems to feel something else. In contrast, an early appraisal model 
allows the observer to experience any vicarious emotion because the observer’s emotion 
is not tied to the target’s emotional state.  
Emotional observer. Non-matching responses are a bigger problem for empathy 
theories when the observer feels something that the target doesn’t feel. The observer 
might feel embarrassed for a target who shows no sign of embarrassment (Krach et al., 
2011) or feel angry for a target who is sad (Hoffman, 2000, p. 98). Classical conditioning 
can account for these cases, but only if the observer’s conditioned response to the 
target’s emotion expression or situation differs from the target’s response. For example, 
this could happen if others’ positive emotional expressions signal that they have won 
                                                             
5 Although the term appraisal has appeared in the empathy literature, it has not been 
used to connect empathy theories to appraisal theories of emotion, as we do in this 
paper. 
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the prize that you had been hoping for (Englis, Vaughan, & Lanzetta, 1982). Mimicry 
falls apart because the observer only mimics observed emotions. Similarly, mirror 
neuron and perception-action approaches require the observer to perceive the target’s 
state and they do not explain vicarious emotions that do not match that state. Direct 
perception, mediated perception, and role-taking allow the observer to recall 
experiences that have emotional content that differs from the target’s expressed 
emotion, though it may be difficult to predict when memories with matching or non-
matching emotional content will come to mind.  
Hoffman (2000) suggests that, at least in the cases of anger, sympathy, and guilt, 
the empathy-generating processes produce emotion matching first and then the 
observer transforms the empathic response by making attributions of responsibility for 
the target’s situation. This second step of attribution goes beyond his five empathy-
generating mechanisms. It begins to look like a late appraisal model of empathy where 
the observer’s interpretation of the target’s situation determines what the observer 
ultimately feels. Yet that first step of matching is only necessary if we reject an early 
appraisal model and insist that the target’s state is what causes the observer’s emotion.
Summary  
Each of the seven processes proposed by empathy theorists explains how an 
observer feels what a target feels under certain circumstances: when the observer either 
has some relevant past experience, or directly perceives the target’s state or situation, or 
both. Consequently, the observer has an unemotional response to the target when the 
observer lacks relevant experience or does not attend to (and therefore does not directly 
perceive) the target’s emotional experience. In addition, the observer can regulate and 
inhibit an emotional response to the target. None of these three explanations apply 
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when the observer reacts to the target’s emotional experience with an emotion that is 
different from what the target feels. Although this second case of non- matching 
receives little attention in the empathy literature, some of the processes could account 
for it if the observer’s conditioning history or emotional memory involves an emotional 
response that is different from what the target feels. Other mechanisms offer no 
explanation.  
Appraisal Theory of Emotion 
Many of the current empathy mechanisms are limited in their ability to explain 
non- matching because they focus on the target’s emotional state as the primary cause of 
empathy. If the target displays no emotion, then the observer will feel no vicarious 
emotion. Adam Smith (1759/2002) had a different idea in his Theory of Moral Sentiments:  
Even our sympathy6 with the grief or joy of another, before we are informed of 
the cause of either, is always extremely imperfect. General lamentations, which 
express nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a curiosity to 
inquire into his situation, along with some disposition to sympathize with him, 
than any actual sympathy that is very sensible. The first question which we ask 
is, What has befallen you? Till this be answered, though we are uneasy both from 
the vague idea of his misfortune, and still more from torturing ourselves with 
conjectures about what it may be, yet our fellow- feeling is not very considerable. 
Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of 
the situation which excites it [emphasis added]. (pp. 14-15)  
 
In other words, Smith argues that empathic emotions are not based on how we perceive 
the other’s state, but rather they are based on how we interpret the other’s situation. If 
this is true, then non-matching emotional responses are no longer a problem—the 
observer’s emotion is not limited to what the target feels, but instead it can be any 
emotion that the observer’s interpretation of the target’s situation can produce. Smith’s 
emphasis on how we interpret others’ situations fits nicely with appraisal theories of 
                                                             
6 The word empathy did not exist in the English language during Smith’s time, so he 
uses the term sympathy to refer to “fellow-feeling”—what we mean by empathy. 
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emotion, which we can use to connect empathy to emotion theory. 
Just as Smith argued that our empathic emotions are based on how we interpret 
another’s situation, appraisal theories argue that firsthand emotions are based on how 
we interpret our own situations (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 
Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1984; Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007; C. A. Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985). Appraisal theories make three general claims about emotion. First, 
emotions are based on appraisals of the situation. Second, the boundary between 
qualitatively different emotions is continuous. Third, emotions have universal patterns 
of appraisal.
Emotions are Based on Appraisals of the Situation  
Appraisal theories argue that emotional experience is based on evaluative 
interpretations of the situation (appraisals). In some of their early research, appraisal 
theorists tried to find combinations of appraisals that could map out typical emotional 
experience (Scherer, 1984; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). As one example, C. A. Smith 
and Ellsworth (1985) found that subjects differentiated 15 emotion labels (e.g., 
happiness, pride, anger, guilt) with six appraisals. First, there was the appraisal of how 
pleasant the situation was (pleasantness). Second, there was the appraisal of how much 
effort was needed to deal with the situation (anticipated effort). Third, there was the 
appraisal of how much the situation was out of anyone’s control (situational control). 
Fourth was the appraisal of how much oneself or another person was responsible for 
the situation (self-other agency). Fifth was the appraisal of how much their attention 
was drawn to the situation rather than diverted away from the situation (attentional 
activity), which is akin to the appraisal of novelty in other appraisal models (e.g., 
Scherer, 2013). Finally, there was the appraisal of certainty about what was happening 
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in the situation or what would happen next (certainty; for a review of appraisal theories 
and other proposed dimensions of appraisal, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). C. A. 
Smith and Ellsworth initially proposed appraisal dimensions for legitimacy and 
perceived obstacle as well, but legitimacy was subsumed by pleasantness, and 
perceived obstacle was subsumed by pleasantness and anticipated effort. The factor on 
which effort and perceived obstacle loaded most strongly is akin to the appraisal of goal 
conduciveness in other appraisal models (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2013).  
Figure II.1 displays a schematic plot of where six of the emotions fell along four 
of the appraisal dimensions. Some emotions had largely overlapping patterns of 
appraisal—sadness and fear differed primarily on the appraisal of certainty, whereas 
happiness and challenge differed only on the appraisal of anticipated effort. So if two 
patients waiting to hear the results of their cancer screening tests feel sad and scared, an 
appraisal theorist would expect the sad patient to feel more convinced that the test will 
be positive (certainty appraisal) than the scared patient, though both would find it 
unpleasant (pleasantness appraisal) and out of anyone’s control (situational control 
appraisal); if two people working on a puzzle feel happy and challenged, an appraisal 
theorist would expect the latter to find the puzzle to be more difficult (anticipated effort 
appraisal) than the former, though both would find it enjoyable. Other emotions had 
very little overlap—pride and fear differed on pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, 
situational control, and self-other responsibility. This can be seen in Figure II.1, where 
pride and fear appear on opposite sides of each appraisal dimension.  
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Figure II.1. Appraisal patterns of emotions. This schematic plot of six emotions along 
four appraisal dimensions is based on results from C. A. Smith & Ellsworth (1985). 
 
The way that people appraise situations along the appraisal dimensions can vary 
continuously. One does not need to have either full control or no control in a situation, 
but there can be degrees of control. The outcome of a situation does not need to be 
either completely certain or completely uncertain, but there can be degrees of certainty. 
The facts that emotional experience is based on appraisals and that appraisals vary 
continuously brings us to the second claim of appraisal theories: the boundary between 
“qualitatively different” emotions is continuous.
Boundaries Between Emotions are Continuous  
The common sense view of emotions is that they are discrete states that are 
governed by separate psychobiological systems. You feel fear because there is a 
dedicated fear system that turns on. You feel joy when a dedicated joy system turns on. 
Your anger ends when the anger system turns off. In the emotion literature, this is 
called a categorical or basic emotions theory (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 2007). In contrast, 
appraisal theories argue that the boundaries between different emotions are continuous. 
There are no separate emotion systems. Because our appraisals of situations occur along 
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a continuum and what we feel is based on our appraisals, so too our emotional 
experiences occur along a continuum. When we say that we feel angry, we are really 
describing a variety of emotional experiences that shade into each other with no clear 
boundaries. There can be many different kinds of anger that vary somewhat in the 
pattern of appraisal, but that are similar enough for us to use the same word to describe 
them. Even the boundary between experiences that we call anger and experiences that 
we call fear or any other emotion is fuzzy. From an appraisal theory perspective, we use 
emotion labels such as “anger,” “fear,” “gratitude”, and “hope” because they describe 
common feelings that go with common ways that we appraise situations, not because 
they have separate emotion systems (Scherer, 1984; 1994).  
From a basic emotions perspective, the question for empathy research to answer 
is how seeing another person’s emotion system turned on (e.g., that person’s sad 
system) activates one’s own system for the same emotion (one’s own sad system). From 
an appraisal theory perspective, this is the wrong question to ask because there are no 
distinct emotion systems. Instead, the question to ask is how appraisals of the situation 
contribute to both firsthand and vicarious emotions. We believe that an answer to this 
question can be found in a third claim of appraisal theories: that emotions have 
universal patterns of appraisal.
Emotions Have Universal Patterns of Appraisal  
Appraisal theories claim that any two people who appraise situations in the same 
way, regardless of whether they appraise the same situation or different situations, will 
feel the same thing (Scherer, 1997). This is the way that emotions are universal. So far 
appraisal theorists have only discussed the universality of appraisals when different 
people react to situations that happen to them personally. Appraisal theorists have not 
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said much about feeling emotions for someone else, either the same or different 
emotions. Nevertheless, we think that the claim of universal patterns of appraisal is the 
way to bridge emotion theory and empathy theory—an observer who appraises a 
target’s situation in the same way that the target appraises it will feel the same emotion 
as the target.  
An Appraisal Theory of Empathy 
We propose an appraisal theory of empathy based on appraisal theories of 
emotion. Although others have discussed appraisals in the context of empathy 
(Omdahl, 1995), the implications of appraisal theory for empathy are missing from the 
peer-reviewed literature. When appraisals are mentioned by empathy theorists, they are 
treated as moderators that change or eliminate empathy (Lamm et al., 2007a; Lamm et 
al., 2007b; Preston & Hofelich, 2012) A central element of an appraisal theory of 
empathy is that an observer’s appraisal of a target’s situation crucially determines the 
observer’s vicarious emotional experiences, including empathy.  
According to the theory, empathy is possible whenever an observer appraises a 
target’s situation. If the observer appraises the target’s situation the same way as the 
target, then empathy occurs. If the observer appraises the target’s situation differently, 
then a different emotional experience occurs. Empathy is not a special process. Instead, 
it is a part of normal emotion processes.
The Relationship Between Empathy, Vicarious Emotions, and Firsthand Emotions  
The phenomenon that empathy researchers want to explain is emotion matching. 
Some theorists have found it useful to identify empathy as the process that produces 
emotion matching rather than the outcome itself (Hoffman, 2000; Preston & de Waal, 
2002). This approach works well if one assumes that emotion matching requires a 
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unique process. In contrast, in an appraisal theory of empathy, empathy is just one 
possible outcome of a general emotion process. What distinguishes empathy from other 
emotional experiences? Empathy occurs when an observer appraises a target’s situation 
and appraises it in the same way as the target.  
Empathy and other vicarious emotional experiences. How does empathy relate 
to non- matching vicarious emotions, such as feeling scared for someone who is sad? In 
an appraisal theory of empathy, all vicarious emotions occur when an observer 
appraises a target’s situation. The difference is that with empathy the observer’s 
appraisal and the target’s appraisal match and with other vicarious emotional 
experiences they do not.  
Imagine that your friend got sick following an international vacation that the two 
of you took together. You are waiting with your friend in the hospital to hear the results 
of a test for malaria. Both you and your friend think that a positive test result would be 
awful (low pleasantness appraisal) and that your friend was extremely unlucky (high 
situational control appraisal). Your friend feels fairly sure that the test will come back 
positive (moderate certainty appraisal) and feels sad. If you also feel confident that the 
test will be positive, then you will feel sad with your friend. We would call this 
empathy because you feel what your friend feels. If, however, you feel that you have no 
idea what the test result will be (low certainty appraisal), then you will feel scared for 
your friend. We would call this a non-matching vicarious emotion because it is not what 
your friend feels. The only difference is whether you have appraised the situation in the 
same way as your friend or not.  
If we could quantify how certain you are about the negative outcome, then 
would your sadness become fear—would your empathy become a non-matching 
vicarious emotion—when you are 70% certain? What about 60% certain? Or would it 
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have to be as low as 50% certain? What if you go back and forth between feeling certain 
and uncertain about the test result while you wait with your friend? You would waver 
between empathy (sadness in this case) and vicarious fear. The degree to which your 
appraisals match—and to which your emotional experience is empathic and not just 
vicarious—is continuous. There is no distinct boundary between empathic and non-
matching vicarious emotions, just as there is no distinct boundary between sadness and 
fear. You might experience multiple vicarious emotions as your appraisal of the other’s 
situation unfolds.  
Vicarious emotions and firsthand emotions. How do empathy and other 
vicarious emotional experiences relate to firsthand emotions? From an appraisal theory 
perspective, all emotions are part of the same appraisal process. The difference between 
firsthand and vicarious emotions is whether observers appraise something that happens 
to themselves or something that happens to someone else.  
Imagine again that you are waiting with your friend in the hospital. As you wait 
with your friend, you begin to wonder if you should also get a malaria test. You begin 
to entertain the real possibility that you too have malaria but you feel terribly uncertain 
about it. Now your appraisals are like the example of vicarious fear above, but you are 
appraising your own situation and not your friend’s situation. We would call this a 
firsthand, non-vicarious emotion.  
The line between firsthand emotions and vicarious emotions is not defined by 
whether or not the target’s situation has personal consequences for the observer, but by 
what the observer is appraising in the moment. You may simultaneously fear that your 
friend has malaria and that you have malaria, or you may feel each fear in turn as your 
attention shifts between your friend and yourself.  
Several theoretical perspectives on empathy emphasize that the observer must 
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maintain a sense of self as distinct from the target for emotion matching to become true 
empathy and not to become a firsthand emotional experience (Decety & Chaminade, 
2003; Eisenberg et al., 1991; Singer & Lamm, 2009). The self-other distinction is 
important for theories where the target’s emotional state automatically causes the same 
emotion in the observer. The idea is that if an observer automatically matches a target’s 
emotion, then she might become confused and think that something is happening to 
her. Therefore, the observer must maintain a self-other distinction in order to remember 
that the cause of her emotion is something that happened to the target and not 
something that happened to her. If she maintains this self-other distinction, then she 
experiences empathy; otherwise she feels some firsthand emotion. From the perspective 
of an appraisal theory of empathy, observers already know whether they are appraising 
something that has happened to them or to the target, and in some situations they 
appraise both. Observers are aware of what caused their emotions and there is not the 
same risk of confusion that comes from context-free automatic matching processes.  
In summary, the differences between firsthand emotions, empathy, and other 
vicarious emotional experiences have to do with what one appraises (another’s 
situation or one’s own situation) and how one appraises it (in the same way as the other 
or differently from the other). What they have in common is that they are all a part of 
the same general emotion process. Empathy is one possible outcome of the process. 
Alternative outcomes are common. We discuss this point next.
Empathy is One Possible Outcome of the Appraisal Process  
It is sometimes called an empathy failure when an observer does not match a 
target’s emotions, as though empathy is the default outcome of encountering another’s 
emotional experience and a lack of empathy means that something has gone wrong 
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(Cikara et al., 2011). In contrast, the appraisal theory perspective treats empathy as a 
special case of the observer’s appraisal process. Alternative outcomes that are discussed 
in the empathy literature such as empathic anger, personal distress, and schadenfreude 
are also special cases of the same appraisal process.  
Imagine that your co-worker has just learned that she will be laid off. Your co-
worker finds this to be an unpleasant event (low pleasantness appraisal) that it is likely 
to happen (moderate certainty appraisal). Your co-worker believes that the general state 
of the economy made it necessary for the company to cut costs and so she lost her job 
due to bad circumstances (a high situational control appraisal). An appraisal theorist 
would predict that appraisals of low pleasantness, moderate certainty, and high 
situational control would mean that your co-worker feels sad about losing her job. You 
also appraise her situation to be unpleasant, certain, and caused by bad circumstances. 
You feel sad for your co-worker. This is prototypical empathy.  
Now imagine a similar scenario, but you know something that your co-worker 
does not know. You know that the boss dislikes her and has wanted to find an excuse to 
fire her for a long time. You appraise the situation differently—like your co-worker, you 
still find it to be unpleasant and certain, but you believe the boss is lying about the bad 
economic circumstances and you blame the boss for your co-worker’s job loss (a low 
situational control appraisal and high other-agency appraisal). An appraisal theorist 
would predict that the appraisal of low situational control and high other-agency would 
make you feel angry. You feel angry for your co-worker but your co-worker feels sad. 
This experience departs from the empathy prototype because the appraisals differ. 
Some call this empathic anger, even though the target is not angry (Vitaglione & 
Barnett, 2003).  
Perhaps instead your co-worker’s situation reminds you that the boss has asked 
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to meet with you later. You suspect that you will be laid off next and you prepare 
yourself to cope with the loss of your job. You feel that this is an unpleasant event (low 
pleasantness appraisal), you feel somewhat confident that it will happen (moderate 
certainty appraisal), and you blame the bad economy (high situational control 
appraisal). You are no longer paying attention to your co- worker’s situation, even 
though your appraisal pattern matches hers and you also feel sad. This experience 
departs from the empathy prototype because you are appraising your own situation 
rather than your co-worker’s situation, even though your co-worker’s situation 
contributed to your emotional state and your appraisal patterns match. This is personal 
distress (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Eisenberg, Fabes, Schaller, 
& Miller, 1989; Singer & Lamm, 2009).  
Finally, the person who gets laid off might not be just any co-worker, but 
someone who you think is a jerk. You might not appraise the situation as a bad thing at 
all, but as a well- deserved punishment (high pleasantness) that will definitely happen 
(high certainty) and that is your co-worker’s own fault (low situational control/high 
other-agency). You feel happy that justice has been done. This experience departs from 
the empathy prototype because your appraisal differs (more radically than in the 
previous example). This is schadenfreude (Cikara et al., 2011; R. H. Smith, Powell, 
Combs, & Schurtz, 2009).  
Each of these cases involves a different emotional outcome, but each comes from 
the same appraisal process. What differs is what you appraise (your own situation or 
another’s situation) and how you appraise it (in the same way as or in a different way 
from the other person). There are no empathy failures because empathy is not the 
default outcome. The same appraisal process is involved in all emotional experience, 
not just empathy.  
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We have now presented the basic ideas behind an appraisal theory of empathy 
and vicarious emotions. We evaluated other theories of empathy based on their ability 
to explain matching and non-matching emotional responses to others’ emotional 
experiences. In order for the appraisal theory of empathy to be useful, it must address 
the two non-matching problems.  
Appraisal and the Non-Matching, Unemotional Observer  
From an appraisal theory perspective, an observer should feel emotional for a 
target as long as the observer appraises the target’s situation. If the target’s situation 
does not attract the observer’s attention, which involves appraisals of novelty, or if the 
observer lacks enough information to appraise the target’s situation, then the observer 
will react relatively unemotionally.  
Novelty. Emotional episodes begin when something changes. In appraisal 
theories this involves the appraisal of novelty. Although the focus of appraisal theories 
has been on novel events that happen to oneself, the “something new” could be 
someone else’s emotional expression, such as when a person near you begins to furrow 
her brow, clench her teeth, and ball her fists. Or it could be someone else’s situation, 
such as when you hear on the news that an apartment caught fire and dozens of 
residents are now without a home.  
If the observer is too distracted or if the event is too subtle, then she is unlikely to 
detect that something new has happened and feel emotional for a target. As with other 
empathy theories, the observer must notice the target’s emotion expression or situation. 
If the observer is occupied with work, watching television, daydreaming, in the middle 
of a conversation with someone else, or engrossed in some other emotional experience, 
then she is unlikely to react emotionally to the target’s situation. If the target inhibits his 
emotional expression, then the observer might be less likely to notice, appraise what has 
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happened, and feel emotional for the target.  
The target’s emotion expression or situation must truly be novel from the 
observer’s point of view. If the target is always in a foul mood, then a scowl is nothing 
new. If the observer encounters situations like the target’s on a routine basis, then even 
if it is novel for the target, the observer might not react emotionally. Perhaps this is one 
reason why doctors have weak vicarious responses to images of physical pain (Y. 
Cheng et al., 2007; Decety et al., 2010)— when you treat patients every day, the novelty 
wears off.  
Lack of Information. Once the target catches the observer’s attention, the 
observer must have enough information about the target’s situation to make some 
relevant appraisals. If the observer lacks sufficient information about the target’s 
situation, then he might feel little more than confusion.  
The discussion of direct and indirect perception is relevant here. Observers who 
perceive targets’ situations directly might often have more information about what 
happened compared to those who learn about it indirectly. If they learn about what 
happened to the target through language or imagination, they might have a harder time 
understanding the situation well enough to make an appraisal. Emotional memories 
might not just make an observer emotional because of the past personal experience, but 
they might also fill in some gaps in the observer’s appraisal of the target's situation. So 
if a target discusses her divorce, an observer might use his own experience of divorce to 
better understand what exactly the target is going through. His appraisal of the target’s 
situation is supplemented by his own experience. This might change if the target points 
out differences in their experiences or if the informational value of the observer’s own 
experience is otherwise called into question. If past experiences help observers appraise 
targets' situations, then this might be one reason why people are more sympathetic 
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toward each other when they have had similar experiences (Barnett, Tetreault, & 
Masbad, 1987; Hodges, Kiel, Kramer, Veach, & Villanueva, 2010)—those who lack 
experience are not sure how to make an appraisal.  
The information that the observer has does not need to be complete in order for 
him to feel something for the target. It only must be enough to make him feel confident 
in his appraisal (for a similar argument about firsthand emotions, see Tong, Teo, & 
Chia, 2014). In many cases of vicarious emotions, the information that the observer has 
about the target’s situation is likely to be incomplete. As a result, the observer’s 
emotions will differ from the target’s emotions to the extent that the different 
information leads to different appraisals (and we return to this point later).  
Empathy theorists generally emphasize perception of another’s emotional state 
rather than situation as the primary cause of empathic emotions. Although an appraisal 
theory of empathy and vicarious emotions emphasizes perception of another’s 
situation, emotional expressions also provide information about the situation. Indeed, 
observers use targets’ emotional expressions to make inferences about both the 
observers’ own situations (Parkinson, 2011; Parkinson & Simons, 2009) and about how 
the targets evaluate their own situations (de Melo, Carnevale, Read, & Gratch, 2014; 
Hareli & Hess, 2010; Scherer & Grandjean, 2008; van Kleef, 2009; van Kleef et al., 2011). 
Most obviously, emotional expressions usually communicate whether something good 
or bad has happened. Expressions of emotions such as joy, fear, and sadness might be 
sufficient to trigger an observer’s appraisals of pleasantness. For these emotions, an 
observer might trust the emotional expression of the target unless given a reason not to 
do so. For example, if the observer believes that the target is chronically anxious, then 
the observer might not believe that the target’s fearful emotional expression is 
informative. Some emotions, such as anger, might require knowledge of the situation 
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before they are vicariously experienced. There is too much risk in setting oneself against 
the object of the target’s anger before knowing whether this third party actually did 
something wrong (A. Smith, 1759/2000).  
We have discussed ways in which a lack of novelty or a lack of information could 
lead the observer to react relatively unemotionally. Another way that an observer might 
react “unemotionally” is when the observer appraises the target’s situation as a neutral 
event rather than as something good or bad. This involves appraisals that contribute to 
the valence of the situation, and it brings us to the question of goals in emotion. We 
discuss valence next.  
Valence. Next comes the problem of valence—is what happened good or bad? 
What makes it good or bad? To answer this question for firsthand emotions, many have 
emphasized that emotions are about personal goals or personal wellbeing (Frijda, 1988; 
Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & C. A. Smith, 1988; Moors, 2010; C. A. Smith et al., 1993). If an 
event helps you achieve some personal goal, then it’s good. If it gets in the way of a 
personal goal, then it’s bad. Empathy becomes an anomaly because it seems to have 
little do with our own goals.  
Some empathy theorists have dealt with this problem by proposing processes 
that link vicarious emotions to past emotional experiences that did involve personal 
goals (classical conditioning, direct and mediated association, role-taking, some aspects 
of perception-action models). Others have dealt with it by proposing processes that 
operate independently of the emotional context (mimicry, mirror neurons, some aspects 
of perception-action models), so that goals are irrelevant. Emotion theorists have dealt 
with it by remaining silent about vicarious emotions .  
All appraisal theorists think that goals are important for emotion. This has led 
them to propose appraisals of goal relevance—the extent to which the situation impacts 
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one’s goals, needs, or other aspects of personal wellbeing—and goal congruence—the 
extent to which the situation advances or obstructs these concerns (Lazarus, 1991; 
Roseman et al., 1990; Scherer, 2013; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Some appraisal 
theorists believe that all emotions are about personal goals or concerns (Frijda, 1988; 
Lazarus, 1991). These theorists often call goal relevance and goal conduciveness 
“primary appraisals” because there can be no emotion without them (Lazarus, 1991). 
This means that what happens to us can only make us emotional if it affects our 
personal wellbeing. For example, if what happens to someone else affects your own 
situation, then it should affect your firsthand emotions. If you learn that another person 
was rejected for a job that you applied to, then you’ve lost a competitor and have a 
better chance to get the job yourself. If the parents of a young child die, then the child 
has lost the people who take care of him.  
From the perspective that all emotions are about personal wellbeing, emotions 
for others are a challenge. If what happens to someone else does not affect your own 
situation, then you should only feel emotions for the other person if you have made 
their wellbeing a personal goal. When something good happens to them, you should 
appraise it as goal-congruent and feel some pleasant emotion. When something bad 
happens to them, you should appraise it as goal- obstructive and feel some unpleasant 
emotion.  
The strong claim that emotions are always about personal wellbeing does not 
just suggest that we should feel less emotional for strangers than for close others—it 
implies that we should not feel emotional at all. This does not seem to be the case. Some 
of the earliest experimental work on appraisal theory had American college students 
watch videos of men from an indigenous tribe in Australia who had the underside of 
their penises cut as part of a cultural tradition (Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Speisman, 
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Lazarus, Mordkoff, & Davison, 1964). It seems unlikely that the students either 
spontaneously adopted goals for the wellbeing of the men in the video or that they 
became concerned that the same thing would happen to them.  
More likely, the American college students appraised the procedure as 
intrinsically unpleasant even though it was motivationally irrelevant. Some appraisal 
theorists have maintained a separation between appraisals of intrinsic pleasantness, the 
pleasantness of the situation in the absence of any salient motivation, and appraisals of 
goal congruence. Although intrinsic pleasantness and goal congruence jointly 
contribute to valence and determine whether a positive or negative emotion will be felt 
(Aue & Scherer, 2008, 2011), there is utility in separating them. First, goal congruence is 
inapplicable if the goal relevance of an event is low, whereas intrinsic pleasantness is 
still applicable. Second, goal congruence can qualify the impact of intrinsic pleasantness 
on the emotional experience. Muscle pain is likely to be a negative experience in the 
absence of a salient goal, but positive if it is interpreted as a sign of progress toward a 
fitness goal (as expressed in the saying, “no pain, no gain”). And the sound of one’s 
favorite song is pleasant during leisure time, but potentially unpleasant during work 
time if it becomes distracting. This division allows motivational concerns to have a 
place when they are relevant without (a) making it impossible for people to feel 
emotions when they do not want anything in particular, such as feeling amused when 
you hear a funny joke, or (b) making it necessary to invent a goal, need, or other 
motivational construct to fit every emotional situation, such as deciding that the joke 
must be congruent with your need to be entertained.  
Separating intrinsic pleasantness from motivational concerns makes it possible to 
feel emotions that are not about personal goals, but it raises other questions about 
emotions for others. Do we only appraise a situation as good or bad when we think it 
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could happen to us? Or do we appraise it as good or bad without inserting ourselves 
into the situation? In other words, we might not think that things like being excluded 
from a group are unpleasant because they’re happening to us, but we might just think 
they are unpleasant for anybody. This might be all that is needed to feel positive and 
negative vicarious emotions. Inserting oneself into the situation might actually 
counteract the vicarious emotions when, through social comparison, an observer feels 
either relieved because the target’s misfortune has not happened to him or envious 
because the target’s good fortune has not happened to him (Brandstätter, 2000; R. H. 
Smith, Eyre, Powell, & Kim, 2010).  
The proposition that we appraise the pleasantness of situations without the need 
to personally experience them is speculative, but if it is true, then there are several ways 
that intrinsic pleasantness and motivational concerns could influence emotions for 
others.  
First, if the target’s situation is not relevant to the observer’s goals, then the 
observer’s appraisal of intrinsic pleasantness should drive the valence of the observer’s 
vicarious emotions. If you learn that some poor children are starving, you appraise their 
hunger as intrinsically unpleasant, even though it does not affect you personally, and 
you feel some negative emotion for them. If you learn that these hungry children now 
have food, then you appraise this as intrinsically pleasant and feel some positive 
emotion for them.  
Second, if the target’s situation is relevant to the observer’s goals but it does not 
affect whether or not the observer attains the goal, then the observer’s salient goal could 
still influence her appraisal of how pleasant the target’s situation is. Thirsty observers 
think that a lost hiker’s worst peril is a lack of water, but cold observers think it’s a lack 
of warm clothes (Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003; O'Brien & Ellsworth, 2012). If you are 
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hungry when you learn that some poor children are starving, you should appraise the 
situation as even more unpleasant than you would if you were sated. Your relief on 
their behalf should be greater when you learn that they now have food. If a target is 
hungry from religious fasting, then devout observers should appraise the situation as 
consistent with religious motives and nonreligious observers should appraise it as goal-
irrelevant and intrinsically unpleasant.  
Third, if the target’s situation is relevant to the observer’s motivational state and 
it advances or obstructs the observer’s goals, then the observer’s appraisals of goal-
relevance and goal-congruence will drive the valence of the observer’s emotion. In this 
case the emotion is likely to be firsthand and not vicarious. For example, if your 
competitor for a job withdraws his application and takes a position at another company, 
then you should appraise the situation as congruent with your goal to get the job. If the 
competitor takes the job that you want, however, then you should appraise the situation 
as goal-obstructive.  
Fourth, if the observer has a goal about the wellbeing of the target, then the 
observer’s appraisals of goal-congruence will drive valence. If your goal is for another 
person to be happy, as with loved ones, then you should appraise whatever contributes 
to the other person's wellbeing as goal-congruent and whatever detracts from the other 
person's wellbeing as goal-obstructive. If your goal is for the target to suffer, as with a 
desire to punish someone who has acted unfairly (Singer et al., 2006), then you should 
appraise whatever contributes to the other person's wellbeing as goal-obstructive and 
whatever detracts from the other person's wellbeing as goal- congruent. In this case, the 
observer's emotional reaction can be connected more closely to the target's emotion than 
to the situation by itself. For example, you might not find losing a teddy bear to be a 
particularly troubling situation. However, if your child is crying because he cannot find 
 46 
his teddy bear, then you might find the situation unpleasant because it upsets your 
child, which is inconsistent with your goal to keep your child happy. Parkinson and 
Simons (2012) call this kind of experience, when we feel emotional about another's 
emotion, an interpersonal meta- emotion.  
The general proposal from an appraisal theory of emotions for others is that an 
observer will feel an emotion for a target, regardless of whether or not the target feels 
emotional, as long as the target’s situation catches the observer’s attention, the observer 
has enough information to appraise the target’s situation, and the observer appraises 
the target’s situation as something good or bad. If the target’s situation lacks novelty, 
the observer lacks information about the target’s situation, or the observer appraises the 
target’s situation as neutral rather than good or bad, then the observer will respond 
unemotionally, regardless of what the target feels. Given that the observer feels some 
emotion for the target, the next question is how to explain vicarious emotions that do 
not match what the target feels.  
Appraisal and the Non-Matching, Emotional Observer  
Sometimes observers describe themselves as "identifying with" targets. We 
suspect that when an observer identifies with a target, it means that he recognizes that 
he appraises the target's situation the same way as the target (and therefore 
empathizes). However, if the observer does not identify with the target, meaning that 
he appraises the target's situation differently from the target, then that does not mean 
that the observer responds unemotionally. Instead, the observer can feel a vicarious 
emotion that does not match what the target feels.  
In an appraisal theory of empathy and vicarious emotions, empathy occurs when 
an observer appraises a target’s situation in the same way as the target. If the observer 
appraises the target’s situation differently, then the observer will have a non-matching 
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vicarious emotional experience. The benefit of the appraisal theory of empathy is that 
one can predict specific matching or non-matching emotions if one knows the 
observer’s pattern of appraisals. The non- matching appraisals hypothesis can be 
broken down into two more specific hypotheses.  
First, the observer’s and target’s emotions will not match if they use different 
information to appraise the target’s situation (different information hypothesis). This 
can occur if the observer knows more about the target’s situation than the target knows 
or if the target has not communicated all of the important information about the 
situation to the observer. This is how we feel fear for the protagonist of a horror film 
who, unlike us, does not know that the killer is lurking around the corner. Empirically, 
the different information hypothesis can be tested by giving information to an observer 
about a target’s situation that the target lacks. This information should affect the 
observer’s appraisal of the target’s situation and the observer’s corresponding emotions. 
There is limited evidence in support of the different information hypothesis from a 
study in which subjects’ empathic responses to patients undergoing a painful medical 
treatment were affected by their knowledge of whether or not treatment was successful 
(Lamm et al., 2007a). Presumably, the patients (who were actually actors posing as 
patients) did not know whether the treatment would succeed. This study was not 
designed to vary the dimensions from appraisal theories and more research is needed to 
test the different information hypothesis. In a recent paper in the organizational 
psychology literature about affective linkage, Elfenbein (2014) discusses how the 
similarity of people's emotional reactions might depend on whether they have a shared 
vantage point, which is similar to our different information hypothesis.  
Second, the observer’s and target’s emotions will not match if their psychological 
states are likely to lead them to appraise the same information differently (different 
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states hypothesis). To put this hypothesis another way, the same facts of the situation 
are available to the observer and the target, but differences in their psychological states 
cause differences in their appraisals. A similar idea was presented by Elfenbein (2014) in 
her discussion of convergent and divergent affective linkages when two people have a 
high shared vantage point.  
As one example of the different states hypothesis, some research suggests that 
people of high power and high social class, or those who have been primed to feel that 
they are high power or high social class, are less empathic and compassionate than 
those with low power or low social class (Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010; Piff, Kraus, Côté, 
Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; van Kleef et al., 2008). Empathy research generally involves 
situations in which the target is sad or afraid, both of which are emotions that usually 
are high in appraisals of situational control (C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), and people 
who feel powerful might be unlikely to make high situational control appraisals ( Kraus 
et al., 2010; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000). As a consequence, observers who feel 
powerful (high personal control) should be less likely to empathize with high 
situational control emotions such as sadness and fear, but they may be more likely to 
empathize with high human agency emotions such as anger and pride.  
As another example of the different states hypothesis, when the observer and 
target have different goals then they should appraise the same facts of the target’s 
situation differently. One mundane example is sporting events. If the star player on an 
observer’s opposing team is injured by a member of the observer’s team, this is 
inconsistent with the player’s desire to win the game but it is consistent with the 
observer’s desire for the opposing team to lose. Observers in this scenario might ignore 
their own team’s fault in the injury more than the injured player and differ in their 
agency appraisals (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954) or they may simply feel happy about the 
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injury because of its goal-congruence (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003).  
As a third example of the different states hypothesis, the observer and the target 
might have different comparison standards that come to mind when they appraise the 
target’s situation. For example, suppose your friend has just had his heart broken by the 
woman he loved. Many would find this situation reasonably painful and feel sad with 
their friend. On the other hand, if earlier that same day you learned that another 
friend’s spouse was killed in a car crash, then the heartbreak might not seem so bad and 
you might not feel so sad.  
The psychological states that affect empathy could involve chronic differences in 
thinking based on things like social class, culture, and experience or they could involve 
temporary differences in thinking based on the current context. They could change how 
the observer and target appraise the same features of the target’s situation or change 
how much attention they pay to specific features. Either way the different states 
hypothesis predicts that any differences in the observer’s and target’s psychological 
states that produce differences in their appraisals of the target’s situation will produce 
non-matching emotions, even if the observer and target have access to the same 
information about the situation.  
The major strength of the appraisal theory of empathy and vicarious emotions is 
that it makes general organizing predictions about emotion matching that can be 
translated into specific, novel hypotheses. Equipped with research-based knowledge of 
the appraisal profiles of different emotions, researchers can manipulate or measure 
appraisals to predict both empathic and non-matching vicarious emotions. 
Alternatively, researchers can use an observer’s emotional response to a target’s 
situation to infer the observer’s appraisals. Problematic appraisal dimensions can be 
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identified and targeted for interventions that increase empathy.
Implications of the Theory for Perspective Taking  
Perspective taking is discussed as a mechanism for empathy both in Hoffman’s 
theory and in some perception-action approaches (Decety & Jackson, 2006; Decety & 
Moriguchi, 2007; Hoffman, 2000). Perspective taking is considered to be an effortful 
process that is especially important when more automatic processes do not cause 
empathy. We propose that perspective taking can cause empathy if it either directs an 
observer’s attention to important features of the target’s situation that are not salient or 
changes the observer’s appraisals so that they match the target’s appraisals.  
Most experimental manipulations of perspective taking ask subjects to consider 
what a target is thinking or feeling (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Lamm et al., 
2007a). According to an appraisal theory of empathy and other vicarious emotional 
experiences, these general instructions should only succeed if the subject attends to the 
appropriate features of the target’s situation and appraises them the same way that the 
target appraises them. Imagine if instead researchers were to use more guided 
perspective taking manipulations. For example, perspective taking instructions could be 
specific about which aspects of the target’s situation subjects should consider. Or, if the 
researcher believes that the subject’s appraisal of the target’s situation will differ from 
the target's appraisal, then the researcher could address the problematic appraisal 
dimensions directly. For example, the appraisal of perceived effort differentiates 
frustration from boredom and challenge from happiness (C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). Observers who have experience with tasks are likely to appraise them as less 
effortful than targets who are trying them for the first time. It may be more effective to 
remind the experienced observers how much effort it took their first time than to give 
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them general perspective taking instructions. Guided perspective taking instructions 
also might produce empathy more effectively when the observer and target have a 
conflict of interest (Epley et al., 2006).  
We are not aware of any research that has used specific appraisals to guide 
perspective taking. The effects of perspective taking on empathy might be mediated by 
changes in the observer’s appraisals, but research is needed to test this idea. The effects 
of perspective taking on appraisal also may explain its success at increasing compassion 
(Batson et al., 1997; Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978). Although 
there are only ad hoc descriptions of compassion appraisals that are not based on 
empirical investigations (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon- Thomas, 2010), there is strong 
evidence that appraisals of high situational control make people feel compassion for 
others (Schwarzer & Weiner, 1991; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982). Other research 
has demonstrated that perspective taking can decrease the actor-observer bias by 
increasing observers’ situational attributions for actors’ behavior, particularly for 
negative events (Betancourt, 1990; Galper, 1976; Gould & Sigall, 1977; Storms, 1973; 
Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). When perspective taking manipulations are 
employed in typical compassion research paradigms, they might increase compassion 
by directing subjects’ attention to situational causes of a target’s misfortune. Appraisals 
of situational control might mediate the effects of perspective taking on compassion in 
typical compassion experiments.  
Beyond Association-Based Processes for Vicarious Emotions 
The history of empathy research in psychology is rich with association-based 
processes.7 In classical conditioning, the target’s emotional experience is associated with 
                                                             
7 We are grateful to Richard Gonzalez for this idea. 
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an unconditioned stimulus that produces the observer’s empathic emotion. In mediated 
association, direct association, and role-taking the target’s experience is associated with 
the observer’s emotional memories that produce the empathic emotion. In mimicry, the 
target’s emotional experience is associated with the observer’s emotional expression, 
which is associated with the related emotion. In mirror neuron and perception-action 
theories, the target’s emotional experience is associated directly with the observer's 
representation of the same emotional state.  
The main limitation of association-based processes is that they do not explain the 
variety of vicarious emotional experiences that diverge from a target’s experience. We 
do not propose that such associative processes do not occur, just that they are 
incomplete. Appraisal theory complements some of them well. With classical 
conditioning, the conditioned cues might continue to signal that some pleasant or 
unpleasant situation is coming, but the observer’s emotional response depends on his 
current appraisal of the situation, not just the past appraisal. If the observer feels greater 
or lesser degrees of control, for example, then he might feel angry instead of afraid, or 
vice versa. We have discussed how the emotional memories from direct association, 
mediated association, and role-taking might help the observer appraise the target’s 
situation. Nevertheless, the appraisal theory, as a theory of emotion in general rather 
than empathy in particular, can go beyond association-based processes to explain a 
broader range of emotional phenomena, including empathy and non-matching 
vicarious emotions, without becoming so broad that it loses its theoretical value.  
Conclusion 
Empathy, feeling what another person feels, has a name. It has been treated as a 
special kind of phenomenon that is separate from firsthand emotional experience. 
Current empathy theories explain it fairly well. Empathy’s sibling, feeling something 
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for others that they do not feel, remains nameless. Despite their strong resemblance to 
empathy, non-matching vicarious emotions are neglected by empathy theorists as well 
as emotion theorists. Yet, are empathy, non- matching vicarious emotions, and firsthand 
emotions really three separate phenomena that require three separate explanations?  
We have introduced an appraisal theory of empathy and vicarious emotions 
based on appraisal theories of emotion to provide a unified view of emotion in which 
the same appraisal process explains all three phenomena. The differences among the 
three are what one appraises and how one appraises it. The main propositions from the 
theory are:  
1. Firsthand and vicarious emotions are based on appraisals of situations.  
2. Firsthand emotions occur when observers appraise their own situations and 
vicarious emotions occur when observers appraise targets’ situations.  
3. An observer has a relatively unemotional reaction to a target’s emotional 
experience when:  
a. The observer does not appraise the target’s situation. 
b. The observer appraises the target’s situation as ordinary rather than novel. 
c. The observer does not have enough information about the target’s 
situation to appraise it.  
d. The observer appraises the target’s situation as neutral rather than 
pleasant or unpleasant.  
4. Empathy occurs as a special case of vicarious emotions when the observer 
appraises the target’s situation in the same way that the target appraises it. 
5. An observer has an emotional reaction to a target’s emotional experience that 
does not match what the target feels when: 
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a. The observer appraises the target’s situation differently from the target 
because the observer and target use different information to appraise the 
situation (different information hypothesis). 
b. The observer appraises the target’s situation differently from the target 
because the observer and target are in psychological states that make them 
appraise the same information differently (different states hypothesis).  
The theory emphasizes the perception of a target’s situation. Although other 
theories have acknowledged the target’s situation, it has not been the main thrust. 
Instead the target’s emotional state or expression has been emphasized, especially in the 
more recent mirror neuron and perception-action theories. Additionally, the appraisal 
theory perspective makes novel predictions about how the target’s situation influences 
an observer’s vicarious emotions.  
One of the central problems in the study of emotions for others is what makes 
something that is happening to another person good or bad to an observer. We have 
proposed several possible solutions, but each raises new questions. One solution is that 
we only feel emotions for others when they are relevant to our personal goals—but how 
do we feel emotions for strangers? A second solution is that we automatically feel 
whatever we think someone else feels—but how do we feel emotions for others that are 
different from what they feel? A third solution is that our emotions for others are based 
on personal emotional experiences that do involve personal goals—then why don't we 
ignore others and become focused on our own emotional memories?  
We propose a new possible solution—perhaps we appraise situations as pleasant 
or unpleasant in and of themselves, and not just pleasant or unpleasant because they 
happen to us. And perhaps we can then understand situations in terms of other 
appraisals. This proposal is not so far-fetched. There is no doubt that human emotions 
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can be evoked by the experiences of others. Storytelling is universal across cultures. 
Even very young children are easily moved by the adventures of imaginary people, 
including members of other species such as Peter Rabbit. When Mr. McGregor 
suddenly appears, when he chases Peter with a rake, when Peter gets tangled in a net 
and can’t escape, the child feels fear; when Peter escapes, the child feels relief. No one 
has to teach a child how to understand a story. Instead children seem able to 
understand emotional events without seeing the emotional expression of the characters 
and without ever having experienced the same events; they feel for Peter without ever 
having been chased by a man with a rake or caught in a net.  
Empathy and other vicarious emotional experiences are still a problem, but not a 
unique problem. An empathy problem is why one person feels sad and a second person 
feels nothing about the same bad thing that happens to someone else. An emotion 
problem is why one person feels sad and a second person feels nothing about the same 
bad thing that happens to themselves. These two similar problems might have similar 
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Feeling Emotions for Others That They Don’t Feel:  




Emotions can feel contagious. When someone else laughs or cries it can feel as if 
their expression of emotion infects you with the same joy or sadness, even though 
nothing happened to you. Yet sometimes you feel emotions for others that they do not 
express at all. You can feel intensely embarrassed for a colleague who walks in front of 
an audience with toilet paper stuck to their shoe even if they do not realize it.  
The case of feeling emotions for others, or vicarious emotions, is most interesting 
when whatever happened to them has little to do with what happened to you. Emotions 
are supposed to be about personal concerns (Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & 
Smith, 1988; Moors, 2010), so why would anyone feel emotions for others? Because of 
this problem, vicarious emotions are often treated as though they come from some 
special process, which has been the topic of empathy theories.  
Some empathy theories have tried to address the problem by proposing that you 
automatically feel the emotions that you perceive in others because you mimic their 
emotion expressions and feel the mimicked emotion or because their expression of 
emotion activates your own representation of their emotional state (Bernhardt & Singer, 
2012; Gallese, 2003; Hatfield, Rapson, & Cacioppo, 1993; Hoffman, 2000; Keysers & 
Gazzola, 2009; Preston, 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Preston & Hofelich, 2012). If the 
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primary cause of vicarious emotions is your perception of what someone else feels, then 
it is irrelevant whether or not you have personal concerns at stake in the situation. 
But although you might encounter many people who express emotions on a 
typical day, no one empathizes with everyone all of the time. Why not? The emphasis in 
empathy research has been on situations where you feel the same emotion as another 
person. One way that your emotional response might not match what the other person 
feels is if you feel relatively unemotional. Empathy theories offer two explanations for 
this type of non-matching: you don’t always attend to others' emotional experiences or 
you’re motivated to avoid empathizing (Keysers & Gazzola, 2014; Zaki, 2014). But if 
you are attentive and motivated to empathize, does that mean you will feel the same 
emotion that the other person feels?  
A second way that your emotional response might not match what the other 
person feels is if you do feel an emotion, but it is different from what they feel. You can 
feel embarrassed for others who show no sign of embarrassment (Krach et al., 2011). 
You can feel afraid for the characters in a horror movie who do not know that the bad 
guy is waiting for them around the corner. Empathy theories that say you feel the 
emotions that you perceive in others cannot explain this kind of non-matching. If you 
match the emotion that you think someone else feels, then how do you feel an emotion 
for them that they don’t feel?  
Wondra and Ellsworth (2015) recently proposed an appraisal theory of empathy 
and other vicarious emotional experiences to account for both vicarious emotions that 
match what the other person feels and those that differ from what the other person 
feels. The theory is based on appraisal theories of emotion, which argue that firsthand 
emotional experiences are based on appraisals of the situation. Appraisal theorists have 
proposed sets of appraisals that are most important for differentiating emotional 
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experience. As one example, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) found that subjects 
differentiated 14 emotions using six appraisal dimensions: pleasantness, attentional 
activity, perceived effort, self/other-agency, situational control, and certainty. Some 
emotions had largely overlapping appraisal patterns, such as anger and contempt. 
Others had very little overlap, such as sadness and pride. The six appraisal dimensions, 
and the way that they mapped on to emotional experience, are similar to those found in 
other appraisal theories (for a review, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003).  
Appraisals of agency and control are especially important for differentiating 
negative emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For example, 
appraisals that a negative event was caused by someone else (other-agency) 
characterize anger, whereas appraisals that the event was caused by circumstances out 
of anyone’s control (situational control) characterize sadness. Suppose that a car owner 
witnesses another driver hit and dent her parked car in the middle of winter. If the 
owner believes the driver’s recklessness caused the accident (other-agency), then an 
appraisal theorist would expect her to feel angry. If instead the owner believes that the 
icy roads caused the accident (situational control), then an appraisal theorist would 
expect her to feel sad. The appraisals might change over time and the owner might go 
back and forth between blaming the weather and the driver and feel both sad and angry 
as a consequence.  
 The appraisal theory of empathy and vicarious emotions explains vicarious 
emotional experiences with the same appraisal process (Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015). 
Just as you feel emotions for yourself when you appraise your own situations, you feel 
emotions for others when you appraise their situations. If your appraisal of someone 
else’s situation matches that person’s appraisal, then the you will feel what the other 
person feels and experience empathy. If not, then you will have some other vicarious 
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emotional experience. An observer’s perception of the situation has been used to 
explain how people infer what someone else feels (e.g., Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 
2011; Carroll & Russell, 1996). We are saying something else—that an observer’s 
appraisal of the situation also affects what the observer feels.  
 So far, the theory has not been tested at all. Some indirect experimental evidence 
exists (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2013; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007), but this 
research was not designed to investigate the appraisal-emotion relationships that have 
been studied in the appraisal literature. In the present research, we provide the first 
experimental test of the appraisal theory approach to empathy and vicarious emotions. 
We investigated negative emotional experiences because the emphasis in empathy 
research has been on empathy for negative emotions. And we investigated appraisals of 
agency because agency is particularly important for differentiating negative emotional 
experiences (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
 Our first step in testing the theory was to see if changing an observer’s appraisals 
of someone else’s situation could make them feel an emotion that the other person 
doesn’t feel. We varied the information that subjects received about someone else’s bad 
situation in order to create different appraisals of agency. In two conditions, the target 
of empathy felt sad and believed that circumstances out of their control were 
responsible for their misfortune. In one condition, subjects received information that 
was similar to what the target knew. In a second condition, subjects received 
information that the target didn’t have—someone else was responsible for the 
misfortune. We predicted that subjects whose information implied that a third person 
was to blame would appraise the situation as high in other-agency and feel angry for 
the target (experience a non-matching vicarious emotion). 
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 The main purpose of the research was to see if, when subjects had privileged 
information, they would appraise the situation as high in other-agency and feel 
vicarious anger that the target didn’t feel. However, a secondary goal was to see if, 
when subjects did not have privileged information, we could get them to appraise the 
situation as the target appraised it—due to a situation that was out of the target’s 
control. This was challenging for a couple of reasons. First, prototypical negative events 
that involve high levels of situational control are things like natural disasters or 
unpreventable diseases—victims of tsunamis and brain cancer are rarely blamed. We 
thought it would be implausible to create an other-agency condition in which a third 
party caused a tsunami or brain cancer. Instead, we tried to create a situation in which 
the target mistakenly makes a bad decision, but due to his youth, lack of resources, and 
general disadvantaged life, subjects would attribute his misfortune to his bad situation. 
This meant that we were working against actor-observer bias—people perceive strong 
situational forces that cause their own behavior but not others’ behavior (Eisen, 1979; 
Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Malle, 2006). Second, there was a challenge of emotion 
language—people often say that they feel sad as a general way to express that 
something bad happened and not to refer to specific feelings of sorrow (Smith & 
Lazarus, 1993, p. 261). This meant that subjects might report feeling sad across 
conditions, regardless of their emotional state.   
 According to some empathy theories, people match the feelings of another 
person based on their perceptions of what that person is feeling (Hatfield et al., 1993; 
Gallese, 2003; Keysers & Gazzola, 2009; Preston & de Waal, 2002). If we see a person 
crying we feel sad; if we see a person laughing we feel happy. According to the 
appraisal theory of vicarious emotions, this sort of matching only happens if our 
perceptions of the situation are the same as the other person’s. If we see the situation 
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differently we will experience a different emotion from what the other person feels. The 
purpose of our research is to take the first empirical step to differentiate these two 
perspectives. 
Study 1 Method 
 In Study 1, subjects read about a disadvantaged high school student named Brian 
who applied to college and was rejected from every school. There were two 
experimental conditions. In one condition, Brian’s friend sabotaged his applications but 
Brian did not know this (other-agency condition). In the second condition, the rejections 
resulted from Brian’s disadvantaged background (situational control condition). In both 
conditions, Brian expressed sadness at the end of the story. We predicted that subjects 
would feel angrier in the other-agency condition and sadder in the situational control 
condition. We also predicted that differences in subjects’ emotions would be due to 
differences in their appraisals of what caused the rejections. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 145 (n = 86 women) undergraduate students and community 
members who received course credit or $5 for participating. Two additional subjects 
were excluded because one was sending text messages during the study and the other 
did not finish reading the script. We terminated data collection the week after we had at 
least 64 subjects per condition, which is the sample size needed for 80% power to detect 
a medium-sized effect (d = .5) with a t test. Subjects’ ages ranged from 18 to 50 (M = 
18.92, SD = 2.77). The majority of subjects were European American/White (n = 89) or 
Asian/Asian American (n = 37); 14 were African American/Black, six were 
Latino/Hispanic, one was Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and two identified as 
another racial or ethnic heritage.  
The Story 
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In everyday life, empathy is often evoked by reading or hearing about people we 
have never met. Communicators from novelists, to journalists, to charitable 
organizations seek to create empathy through rich descriptions of people and their 
situations. Instead of using simple vignettes, we attempted to replicate these rich 
descriptions by creating a vivid narrative along the lines of the public radio show This 
American Life (http://www.thisamericanlife.org/). In This American Life, each broadcast 
includes real people’s stories exemplifying a particular theme, such as “Summer Camp” 
or “Encounters with the Police”. The host interviews people about their experience and 
adds background narrative to provide context. We followed this format, using the 
theme “Rejected”. Subjects in Study 1 read the script for the “broadcast”, and in Study 2 
we increased the realism by creating an actual audio broadcast.  
 The story was about a high school student named Brian who comes from a 
disadvantaged background and wants to go to college. No one in Brian’s family has 
gone to college. He is the son of a single mother who was the only person in her family 
to graduate from high school. He spends time with a student group that volunteers in 
poor neighborhoods like his. His high school guidance counselor has been unhelpful 
and he has no other guidance about how to get into college.   
 In contrast, Brian’s friend Andrew comes from a more well-off background. 
Andrew’s parents graduated from Stanford and they have college funds for their 
children. Andrew’s two older sisters are attending elite universities and he has no 
doubt that he will do the same. 
One night Andrew takes Brian to a park where Andrew’s friends are smoking 
marijuana. Brian declines the drugs and asks Andrew to take him home, but before they 
can leave the police arrive and arrest both of them for drug possession. Andrew 
apologizes to Brian for the arrest and asks if he can do anything to make it up. Brian 
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asks Andrew to help him get into college. With Andrew’s help, Brian quickly turns his 
academic life around, becomes a very competitive college candidate, and decides to 
apply to many of the same elite schools as Andrew. Andrew begins to worry that 
Brian’s application is stronger than his own, so Andrew stops helping. 
 Brian comes to a point in the Common Application where he must write about 
his delinquency history and explain the drug arrest. Brian has no idea what he should 
say. What happens next differs by condition: 
HOST: So what did you do? 
BRIAN: Well, again, I really didn’t know what I was supposed to do. At first I wrote 
that it was a huge mistake, I made some bad decisions, I had learned to make better 
choices, and wouldn’t let it happen again.  
 (other-agency condition) I figured that I should talk to Andrew because he had to do it 
too, so I called him and showed him what I wrote, and he said I was doing it completely 
wrong. He said it made me sound too guilty, and you’re not supposed to do that in this 
kind of situation, so he said I should try to play it down a bit. He said that’s the kind of 
thing that he was doing – he wasn’t going to sound too guilty or apologetic and neither 
should I. I asked if I could see what he wrote, and he said no, but he said that he would 
help me write something that was really close to what he wrote, so we worked on the 
explanation together. 
(situational control condition) But then I thought it made me sound too guilty, 
and I thought I remember hearing that you’re not supposed to do that in this 
kind of situation, so I tried to play it down a bit. I thought that I shouldn’t sound 
too guilty or apologetic.  
 Later, Brian’s application is rejected by every college. The radio show host meets 
privately with a college admissions counselor who reviews Brian’s application and says 
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that his explanation for the drug arrest was the fatal flaw. The admissions counselor 
reads the following letter, which the host introduces as the letter that that Andrew 
helped Brian write (other-agency condition) or as the letter that Brian wrote (situational 
control condition): 
 “To whom it may concern, 
 I was arrested once in high school for smoking marijuana with a 
few other people in a park.  
 With regard to my alleged drug offense, I would like to clarify a 
few facts. First, I am committed to avoiding illegal drugs and I have not 
been around them before or since that night. That night was a mistake that 
I do not plan to repeat. Second, I wasn’t even the one who was smoking it, 
it was the other people. The police officer who arrested us was just 
unwilling to recognize that fact. Third, this offense is incredibly common 
among high school students and so it should not reflect poorly on me as a 
candidate for your school. Fourth, my record is completely clean aside 
from that one incident, so clearly I am not some kind of criminal. I was 
just a victim of circumstances.  
 To conclude, with all of my other qualifications considered, I feel 
that it would be a mistake on your part to deny me admission for this 
isolated incident. I hope that you take all of this into consideration as you 
make your decision, because I really feel that I deserve to get into your 
school.” 
 The admissions counselor explains that the applicant never takes responsibility 
or says that he learned anything from the experience, which makes her think that the 
student may not be mature enough for the university environment. The admissions 
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counselor then contrasts Brian’s letter with a letter she remembers reading from another 
applicant who had gone through a similar incident. The other applicant had also hidden 
from the police in a car trunk with drugs (a detail about Brian and Andrew’s situation 
from earlier in the story) but had taken responsibility and his application was accepted. 
The host reminds the audience that this applicant might have been Andrew. The host 
also states that Brian did not know anything about the interview with the admissions 
counselor. 
 In the last lines of the story, Brian expresses his sadness about the rejections: 
HOST: Do you remember how you were feeling the moment that you opened that 
last letter from one of the schools and found out that you weren’t going to college 
this year? 
BRIAN: Yeah. I felt terrible. It was the worst feeling. Like I just couldn’t do 
anything right. 
HOST: And how do you feel about it now? 
BRIAN: You know… I don’t know… defeated? Um… it sucks. It still sucks. I 
don’t know. It was just dumb luck. I guess I just try to remember that it was the 
luck of the draw. I did everything I could, but… I’m still really upset about it. I 
tried so hard to make things work out, but it wasn’t enough, and that just makes 
me feel really sad. I just don’t know how I could do any better. 
In summary, the only difference between conditions was whether Andrew 
told Brian to change the explanation (other-agency condition) or Brian decided to 
change it himself (situational control condition).  
Pilot Testing 
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Before we conducted the experiment, we ran a pilot study with focus 
groups to develop the story. Our goal was to make the two conditions as 
identical as possible while still having subjects blame Brian’s rejections on 
Andrew in the other-agency condition and on Brian’s disadvantaged 
circumstances in the situational control condition. Pilot subjects participated in 
groups of 1-6, read one of the two versions of the story individually, and then 
discussed their reactions to the story as a group. Questions during pilot testing 
focused on who subjects thought was responsible for Brian's rejections, but not 
on their emotional reactions. 
Through this process we revised the story to reduce the chance that 
subjects would blame the police officer, blame Brian for not talking to his high 
school guidance counselor, or blame Andrew for not trying to get the arrest 
expunged from Brian’s record. We found that it was important to show subjects 
the letter that Brian wrote so that they would not blame college admissions. We 
also found that it was important in the other-agency condition to make sure that 
Andrew was not too helpful, to emphasize that Andrew lied about what kind of 
explanation that he wrote for himself, and to remind subjects that Andrew 
helped Brian write the explanation before they saw it. Otherwise they would not 
realize that Andrew intentionally sabotaged Brian’s application.  
Procedure 
 Subjects participated in groups of up to six. They were randomly assigned to 
read the read the other-agency script (n = 71) or to read the situational control script (n 
= 74). The experimenter told subjects that they would read scripts for a storytelling 
radio show, explained the format of the show, and told subjects that they would read 
the story individually and then complete a questionnaire. 
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 The questionnaire measured subjects’ emotional reactions to the story, their 
agency appraisals, their perceptions of Brian’s emotions, and their perceptions of 
Brian’s agency appraisals. 
 First, there was an open-ended question that asked subjects to report their main 
feelings after reading the story. There three short lines for them to write their feelings 
and space below to explain their feelings if they wanted to do so.  
 Second, subjects were asked how much they felt each of the following emotions 
after reading the story (1 = not at all, 6 = extremely): angry, mad, sad, unhappy, 
sympathetic, happy, interested, afraid, compassionate, proud, hopeful, guilty, pitying. 
The items angry and mad (r = .89) were averaged to measure anger. The items sad and 
unhappy were intended to measure sadness, but unhappy was more strongly correlated 
with mad and angry (rs > .64) than with sad (r = .53), so we used sad by itself. We also 
averaged sympathetic and compassionate (r = .60) to measure sympathy, but excluded 
pity due to its lower correlations with sympathetic (.49) and compassionate (r = .26). 
 Third, there was an open-ended question about Brian’s feelings at the end of the 
story that had the same format as the open-ended question for subjects’ own feelings.  
 Fourth, subjects were asked how much Brian felt the same emotions at the end of 
the story that they reported for themselves (1 = not at all, 6 = extremely), except for 
compassionate, sympathetic, and pitying because they are emotions typically felt for 
someone else. The items angry and mad (r = .82) were averaged to measure perceptions 
of Brian’s anger. Although unhappy was most strongly correlated with sad (r = .55), we 
used the single item sad to measure perceptions of Brian’s sadness so that it would 
comparable to subjects’ own sadness.  
 Fifth, to measure agency appraisals, subjects were asked who was responsible for 
Brian not getting into college (1 = not at all responsible, 6 = completely responsible): 
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Brian, Andrew, college admissions, and bad luck. We predicted that subjects in the 
other-agency condition would blame Andrew and those in the situational control 
condition would blame bad luck. We included Brian and college admissions because 
during pilot testing we found that these were the most common alternative targets of 
blame. 
 Sixth, subjects were asked who Brian thought was responsible for him not 
getting into college (1 = not at all responsible, 6 = completely responsible): Brian, 
Andrew, college admissions, and bad luck. These items are not relevant to our 
hypotheses and so for the sake of brevity we do not discuss them further. 
 Next, we included two open-ended questions asking subjects to indicate with 
whom they felt angry if they said they felt angry and with whom Brian felt angry if they 
said Brian felt angry. We initially decided to include these because we found that 
subjects could express anger at a number of different targets during pilot testing, but we 
did not analyze the responses and we do not discuss them in this paper. 
 Finally, subjects completed a demographics questionnaire. 
 Subjects always completed the sections of dependent variables in the same order, 
but the specific items in each of the closed-ended emotion and appraisal sections were 
in one of four randomized orders.  
Study 1 Results 
 We tested four main hypotheses. First, we predicted that subjects in the other-
agency condition would feel angrier than those in the situational control condition. 
Second, we predicted that subjects in the situational control condition would feel sadder 
than those in the other-agency condition. Third, we predicted that the appraisal that 
Andrew was to blame would mediate the difference in anger between conditions. 
Fourth, we predicted that the appraisal that bad luck was to blame would mediate the 
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difference in sadness between conditions. We also tested whether subjects’ perceptions 
of Brian’s emotions affected their own emotions, as some empathy theories predict. 
Plan for Analysis of Open-Ended Emotion Data 
 To test for differences in subjects’ own emotions and their perceptions of Brian’s 
emotions in the open-ended emotion questions, we created groups of emotion words 
that communicated similar feelings. There were four steps to create the emotion groups. 
First, the first author removed subjects’ experimental conditions from the open-ended 
responses, randomized the order of the responses, and identified each emotion word 
that subjects used. Second, the first author used emotion labels from research on basic 
emotions (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971) and from research on appraisal theory (e.g., 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) as a guide to create emotion groups. Third, the second author 
suggested revisions to the emotion groups. Fourth, each subject received a score of 1 for 
an emotion group if they mentioned at least one word in the group and a score of 0 if 
they did not.  
 We examined the emotion groups that had at least 10 observations (see Table 1). 
For subjects’ own emotions, there were six groups: sadness, anger, sympathy, surprise, 
general unpleasantness, and frustration. Frustration was separated from anger because 
the appraisal patterns for the two have some differences; in particular, frustration is not 
necessarily directed toward another person (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For subjects’ 
perceptions of Brian’s emotions, there were also six groups with at least 10 
observations: sadness, anger, general unpleasantness, regret, confusion, and rejection. 
We used logistic regression to test whether experimental condition (0 = situational 
control, 1 = other-agency) affected the probability that subjects felt each emotion or 










    Sadness 
 
depressed, defeated, depressed, despondence, 
disappointed, disappointment, down, helpless, sad, 
saddened, sadness, solemn, sorrow, unfulfilled, 
unsatisfied 
 
    Anger 
 
aggravated, anger, angry, annoyance, annoyed, bitter, 
enraged, irritated, irritation, mad, resentment  
 
    Sympathy 
 
compassion, concern, empathetic, empathy, pity2, sorry, 
sympathetic, sympathy 
 
    Surprise 
 
disbelief, shock, shocked, surprise, surprised 
 
    Unpleasantness 
 
bad, bothered, disturbed, bad, horrible, hurt, stress, 
uncomfortable, unease, uneasiness, uneasy, 
unfortunate, upset 
 
    Frustration 
 
frustration 
    
    Confusion 
 
confused, confusion 
      
Brian’s Emotions  
 
    Sadness 
 
broken down, crushed, defeat, defeated, dejected, 
depressed, depression, demotivated, depressed, 
despair, devastated, disappointed, disappointment, 
discontent, discouraged, disheartened, disillusioned, 
down, down in the dumps, downtrodden, gloomy, 
grief, heartbroken, helpless, hopeless, hopelessness, let 
down, melancholy, put down, sad, sadness, sorrow, 
unfulfilled, unsatisfied,  
 
    Anger 
 
anger, angry, bitter, indignant, mad, resentment 
 
    Unpleasantness 
 
awful, distraught, horrible, hurt, it sucked, terrible, 
unhappy, upset 
 
    Regret 
 
regret, regretful, remorse 
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    Surprise disbelief, shock, shocked, surprised 
 
    Incompetence 
 
failed, failure, inadequacy, incompetent, insecure, 
insufficient, let himself down, like a failure, like he can’t 
do anything right, not good enough, prideless, self-
doubt, unqualified, unworthiness, worthless 
 
    Confusion 
 
confounded, confused, confusion, no idea what to do, 
perplexed, uncertainty, unsure 
 




Subjects’ Own Emotions 
 
 Our first two hypotheses were that (1) subjects in the other-agency condition 
would feel angrier and (2) subjects in the situational control condition would feel 
sadder. 
 Open-ended data. Figure III.1 displays the proportion of subjects who felt sad 
and angry by condition. The data supported our hypotheses. Subjects were more likely 
to feel angry in the other-agency condition (41%) than in the situational control 
condition (20%), B = 1.00, SE = .38, Z = 2.65, p = .008, 95% CI [.27, 1.76], whereas they 
were more likely to feel sad in the situational control condition (51%) than in the other 
agency condition (32%), B = -.79, SE = .08, Z = 2.30, p = .02, 95% CI [-1.47, -.12].  
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Figure III.1. Proportion of subjects who reported feeling sad or angry in the open-ended 
emotion question by condition (Study 1). 
 
 Additionally, subjects were more likely to feel sympathy in the situational 
control condition (51%) than in the other-agency condition (34%), B = -.73, SE = .34, Z = 
2.12, p = .03, 95% CI [-1.41, -.06], but they were more likely to feel surprised in the other-
agency condition (17%) than in the situational control condition (5%), B = 1.27, SE = .60, 
Z = 2.10, p = .04, 95% CI [.16, 2.59]. There were no other differences in their emotions. 
 Closed-ended data. Figure III.2 displays the means and standard errors for 
sadness and anger by condition. Confirming the open-ended analyses and our second 
hypothesis, subjects felt angrier in the other-agency condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.50), 
than in the situational control condition (M = 2.44, 1.35), t(139.93) = 3.90, p < .001, 95% 
CI [.46, 1.40]. In contrast to the open-ended data, subjects did not feel sadder in the 
situational control condition (M = 3.30, SD = 1.40) than in the other-agency condition (M 
= 3.45, SDs = 1.34), t(143) = .67, p = .50, 95% CI [-.30, .60].  
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Figure III.2. Subjects’ average sadness and anger in the closed-ended emotion questions 
by condition (Study 2). The bars represent standard errors. 
 
 Also in contrast to the open-ended data, there were no differences in sympathy 
between the situational control condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.18) and other-agency 
condition (M = 4.30, SD = 1.12), t(142.99) = .84, p = .40, 95% CI [-.22, .54]. 
 In summary, we found consistent support for our first hypothesis that subjects in 
the other-agency condition would feel angrier than those in the situational control 
conditions. We also found support for our second hypothesis that subjects in the 
situational control condition would feel sadder than those in the other-agency condition 
in the open-ended emotion data, but not in the closed-ended emotion data. 
Did Appraisals Mediate the Effects of Condition on Subjects’ Emotions? 
 Our third and fourth hypotheses were that (3) the appraisal that Andrew was to 
blame would mediate the difference in anger between conditions, and, (4) the appraisal 
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that bad luck was to blame would mediate the difference in sadness between 
conditions. First, we examined differences in appraisals by condition. Then, we 
examined the indirect effects of condition on emotions through appraisals. 
 Subjects’ agency appraisals. We predicted that subjects would blame Andrew in 
the other-agency condition and that they would blame bad luck for Brian’s rejections in 
the situational control condition. As predicted, subjects thought that Andrew was 
responsible more in the other-agency condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.01) than in the 
situational control condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.37), t(134.02) = 7.23, p< .001, 95% CI [1.15, 
1.94]; however, they did not think that bad luck was responsible more in the situational 
control condition (M = 2.65, SD = 1.48) than in the other-agency condition (M = 2.61, SD 
= 1.35), t(142.56) = .18, p = .86, 95% CI [-.51, .42]. Instead, subjects thought that Brian was 
responsible more in the situational control condition (M = 4.59, SD = 1.15) than in the 
other-agency condition (M = 3.75, SD = 1.22), t(141.57) = 4.32, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.24, -
.46]. There was also a trend for subjects to think that college admissions was responsible 
more in the situational control condition (M = 2.78, SD = 1.37) than in the other-agency 
condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.27) as well, t(142.85) = 1.78, p = .08, 95% CI [-.82, .04]. 
 Indirect effect of condition on anger through appraisals. If the appraisal theory 
account explains differences in subjects’ vicarious emotions, then the appraisal that 
Andrew was responsible for Brian not getting into college should mediate the difference 
in anger by condition. We used the mediation function from the MBESS (v. 3.3.3) 
package in R to test for mediation using 10,000 bootstrap samples (Kelley, 2007a, 2007b). 
A contrast coded variable for subject condition (-1 = situational control, 1 = other-
agency) was the predictor, the appraisal that Andrew was to blame was the mediator, 
and closed-ended anger was the dependent variable. Indeed, there was an indirect 
effect of experimental condition on anger through appraisals that Andrew was 
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responsible, 95% bias-corrected CI [-.42, -.11], which eliminated the direct effect of 
condition on anger, 95% CI [-.47, .06].3 
Did Perceptions of Brian’s Emotions Cause Subjects’ Vicarious Emotions? 
 According to empathy theories that base one’s emotions for others on 
perceptions of their emotions, subjects’ perceptions of Brian’s emotions should match 
their own vicarious emotions. Although we hypothesized that there would be a 
difference in subjects’ appraisals of agency, not in their perceptions of Brian’s emotions, 
we had the opportunity to test the alternative explanation that our manipulation 
changed subjects' vicarious emotions by changing their perceptions of Brian's emotions. 
We examined whether the differences in subjects’ own emotions by condition were 
matched by differences in their perceptions of Brian’s emotions. 
 Open-Ended Data. The open-ended data for perceptions of Brian’s emotions 
were missing for three subjects due to coding errors. Overwhelmingly, subjects thought 
that Brian felt sad, as we intended. Over 80% of the subjects in both conditions thought 
that Brian felt sad. Subjects were equally likely to think that Brian felt sad in the 
situational control condition (86%) and in the other-agency condition (85%), B = -.13, SE 
= .47, Z = .27, p = .79, 95% CI [-1.07, .80]. They were also equally likely to think that 
Brian felt angry in the situational control condition (10%) and in the other-agency 
condition (4%), B = -.89, SE = .71, Z = 1.25, p = .21, 95% CI [-2.46, .43]. There were no 
other differences in their perceptions of Brian’s emotions. Unlike subjects’ own 
emotions, the probability that subjects’ thought Brian felt sad or angry did not differ by 
condition. These results fail to support the alternative explanation that subjects' own 
emotions were based on their perceptions of Brian's emotions. 
 Closed-Ended Data. There was no difference in perceptions of how sad Brian felt 
in the situational control condition (M = 4.76, SD = 1.06) and the other-agency condition 
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(M = 4.86, SD = 1.09), t(142.33) = .57, p = .57, 95% CI [-.25, .45]. Unexpectedly, there was 
a difference in how angry subjects thought that Brian felt—but it was in the opposite 
direction of their own anger. Subjects thought that Brian was less angry in the other-
agency condition (M = 2.85, SD = 1.34) than in the situational control condition (M = 
3.36, SD = 1.23), t(140.83) = 2.43, p = .02, 95% CI [-.94, -.10]. Because this pattern of 
results is the opposite of what subjects felt, it conflicts with theories that predict that 
perceiving another’s emotion causes the same emotional state in oneself. There were no 
other differences in subjects’ perceptions of Brian’s emotions. 
 Correlations Between Own Emotions and Perceptions of Brian’s Emotions. 
Subjects in the other-agency condition felt angrier but thought that Brian was less angry 
compared to those in the situational control condition. This pattern of results is the 
opposite of what would be expected if perceptions of the Brian’s emotions caused 
subjects’ emotions. Nevertheless, the group-level differences might not reflect the 
individual-level relationship between subjects’ perceptions of Brian’s emotions and 
their own emotions. If perceptions of Brian’s emotions caused subjects’ emotions, then 
there should be positive correlations between subjects’ perceptions of Brian’s sadness 
and their own sadness and between subjects’ perceptions of Brian’s anger and their own 
anger. However, there was no correlation between subjects’ own sadness and their 
perceptions of Brian’s sadness (r = .11, p = .20), nor was there a correlation between 
subjects’ own anger and their perceptions of Brian’s anger (r = .01, p = .91). Whether 
subjects felt sad, angry, or both, this was not caused by their perceptions that Brian felt 
the same emotions. 
Study 1 Discussion 
 In Study 1, we found evidence that subjects’ feelings for another person differed 
according to their appraisals of who was to blame for the other person’s misfortune. 
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Specifically, they felt angrier for the other person when they thought that another 
human agent was responsible, even though the other person only felt sad. There was no 
evidence that their anger had anything to do with their perceptions of how the victim 
felt. This result is consistent with the idea that you can feel an emotion that someone 
else does not feel when you appraise their situation differently from how they appraise 
it. 
 Subjects’ vicarious sadness and sympathy were less consistent than their anger. 
The appraisal data revealed that although pilot testing suggested that subjects would 
forgive Brian’s mistake because of his disadvantage, they blamed him for his 
misfortune in the situational control condition. We tried to address this problem in 
Study 2 by emphasizing Brian’s disadvantage further and downplaying the severity of 
his mistake so that subjects would be less likely to blame him for the rejections. In 
addition, we recorded the story with actors so that subjects could listen to the radio 
show instead of just reading the script.  
Study 2 Method 
 Study 2 was similar to Study 1 except that subjects listened to an audio recorded 
version of the story instead of reading the script. Subjects listened to the story on 
headphones in front of a computer. They completed the dependent measures on the 
computer. 
Changes to the Story  
There were several changes to the story to try to reduce the chance that subjects 
would blame Brian for his failure to get into college. The introductory section that 
introduced the theme, “Rejected”, was cut for the sake of time and Brian’s disadvantage 
was emphasized more by adding a statement that his schoolwork was not great because 
he had to work late every night after school to bring in money for his family. 
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Additionally, the paragraphs that differed between the two conditions were modified to 
emphasize the idea that in the situational control condition Brian was clueless and he 
made a well-intentioned mistake: 
HOST: So what did you do? 
BRIAN: Well, again, I really didn’t know what I was supposed to do. At first I wrote 
that it was a huge mistake, I made some bad decisions, I had learned to make better 
choices, and wouldn’t let it happen again, but I really wasn’t sure what they were looking 
for.  
(situational control condition) I mentioned it to my mom one morning during 
breakfast, and she gave me this great advice that if you just put your best foot 
forward in this kind of situation, then people will respect you for that. Later on I 
read what I had written and I thought my letter wasn’t doing that. I thought it 
made me sound too guilty, and that you’re not supposed to do that in this kind 
of situation, so I tried to play it down a bit. I thought that I should sound more 
confident in myself, so I rewrote it. I did the best I could, but I still really didn’t 
have a clue if that’s what they were looking for. 
(other-agency condition) I figured that I should talk to Andrew because he had to do it 
too, so I called him and showed him what I wrote, and he said I was doing it completely 
wrong. He said it made me sound too guilty, and you’re not supposed to do that in this 
kind of situation, so he said I should try to play it down a bit. He said that’s the kind of 
thing that he was doing – he wasn’t going to sound too guilty or apologetic and neither 
should I. I asked if I could see what he wrote, and he said no, but he said that he would 
help me write something that was really close to what he wrote, so we worked on the 
explanation together. I still really didn’t have a clue if it’s what they were looking for, but 
Andrew said it was perfect. 
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 The other major changes were that the letter Brian submitted to explain his drug 
arrest was modified to sound less harsh and his emotion expression at the end was 
modified to de-emphasize the role of luck in his rejections. 
Changes to the Dependent Variables  
Subjects’ closed-ended self-reports of emotions, their appraisals, their closed-
ended perceptions of Brian’s emotions, and their perceptions of Brian’s appraisals were 
converted to slider scales with scores from 0 to 100. The emotion word “down” replaced 
“unhappy” to measure sadness. 
 Because people see intentional harm as worse than unintentional harm (Ames & 
Fiske, 2013), we added one item to measure subjects’ appraisals of pleasantness (“How 
good or bad do you think it is that Brian didn’t get into college?”, 0 = Extremely good, 
100 = Extremely bad) and one item to measure their perceptions of Brian’s appraisals of 
pleasantness (“How good or bad did Brian think it was that he didn’t get into college?”, 
0 = Extremely good, 100 = Extremely bad). If subjects appraised Brian’s situation as 
worse when he was sabotaged, then this might have increased their reports of negative 
emotions across the board. On the one hand, this might have increased reports of 
sadness in the other-agency condition and eliminated a difference that would have 
otherwise emerged. On the other hand, this might have increased reports of anger in 
the other-agency condition so that the observed differences in anger were due to 
differences in appraised pleasantness, not agency.  
 Finally, the appraisal questions were changed to reflect who subjects blamed 
more explicitly and to refer to bad circumstances rather than bad luck to measure 
situational agency appraisals. Subjects were asked to think about why Brian didn’t get 
into college and state their agreement (0 = Strongly Disagree, 100 = Strongly Agree) that 
it was Brian’s fault, it was Andrew’s fault, it was college admissions’ fault, and it was 
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because of bad circumstances.4 They were asked the same questions about why Brian 
feels that he didn’t get into college, but as in Study 1 these questions are not relevant to 
our main hypotheses and we do not discuss them further. 
Subjects 
 Subjects participated in groups of up to ten. We recruited 126 undergraduate 
students and community members (n = 61 women) who received course credit or $8 for 
participating. We terminated data collection the week after we had at least 64 subjects 
per condition, which is the sample size needed for 80% power to detect a medium-sized 
effect (d = .5) with a t test; however, 10 additional subjects were excluded from analyses 
(5 per condition). Five were excluded because they suspected that the story was fake, 
two because they were using their cell phones or surfing the internet during the study, 
one because she was confused and thought the show mixed up the names of Brian and 
Andrew, one because was falling asleep during the study, and the last because the 
experimenter suspected that he was high on drugs when he arrived. Subjects’ ages 
ranged from 17 to 25 (M = 19.02, SD = 1.26). The majority of subjects were European 
American/White (n = 80) or Asian/Asian American (n = 34); seven were African 
American/Black, seven were Latino/Hispanic, and one identified as another racial or 
ethnic heritage. 
Study 2 Results 
 For all hypothesis tests about subjects own emotions, subjects’ appraisals of 
unpleasantness were added as a covariate in the logistic and linear regression models. 
The coding procedure for the open-ended data in Study 2 was similar to Study 1, except 
that two research assistants assisted the first author with the data coding. 
Subjects’ Own Emotions 
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 Once again, we predicted that subjects in the other-agency condition would be 
more likely to feel angry and subjects in the situational control condition would be more 
likely to feel sad.  
 Open-Ended Data. As in Study 1, there were six emotion groups that had at least 
10 observations, but frustration was replaced by confusion.  
 Figure III.3 displays the predicted probability that subjects felt sad and angry by 
condition at an average level of appraised unpleasantness. As in Study 1, subjects were 
more likely to feel angry in the other-agency condition (68%) than in the situational 
control condition (24%), B = -.95, SE = .21, Z = 4.50, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.39, -.55]. 
Although the pattern for sadness was in the same direction as Study 1, there was no 
significant difference in the probability that subjects felt sad in the situational control 
condition (67%) and in the other-agency condition (60%), B = .16, SE = .19, Z = .86, p = 




Figure III.3. Predicted proportion of subjects who reported feeling sad or angry in the 
open-ended emotion question by condition (Study 2). The predicted proportions are 
based on a logistic regression model with appraised unpleasantness as a covariate and 
set equal to the mean. 
 
 Closed-Ended Data. The items angry and mad (r = .88) were averaged to 
measure anger, sad and down were averaged to measure sadness (r = .66), and 
sympathetic and compassionate were averaged to measure sympathy (r = .48).  
 Figure III.4 displays the means and standard errors for sadness and anger by 
condition at an average level of appraised unpleasantness. As in Study 1, subjects felt 
angrier in the other-agency condition (M = 72.62, SE = 2.98) than in the situational 
control condition (M = 54.84, SE = 3.16), t(116) = 4.07, p < .001, 95% CI [4.56, 13.21]. And 
as in Study 1, subjects felt just as sad in the situational control condition (M = 68.29, SE 
= 2.69) as they did in the other-agency condition (M = 64.94, SE = 2.52), t(119) = .90, p = 
.37, 95% CI [-5.35, 2.00]. Also like in Study 1, subjects felt just as sympathetic in the 
situational control condition (M = 76.87, SE = 2.27) as they did in the other-agency 
condition (M = 72.14, SE = 2.22), t(114) = 1.60, p = .14, 95% CI [-5.54, .81]. 
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Figure III.4. Subjects’ average sadness and anger from the closed-ended emotion 
questions by condition (Study 2). The bars represent standard errors. 
 
 Once again, there was consistent support for the hypothesis that subjects in the 
other-agency condition would feel angrier than those in the situational control 
condition. But although the pattern of means was in the predicted direction, there was 
little support for the hypothesis that subjects in the situational control condition would 
feel sadder than those in the other-agency condition. 
Did Appraisals Mediate the Effects of Condition on Subjects’ Emotions? 
 As in Study 1, we predicted that the appraisal that Andrew was to blame would 
mediate the difference in anger between conditions and that the appraisal that bad 
circumstances were to blame would mediate the difference in sadness between 
conditions.  
 Subjects’ agency appraisals. We predicted that subjects would blame Andrew in 
the other-agency condition and that they would blame bad circumstances in the 
situational control condition. As predicted, subjects thought that Andrew was 
responsible for Brian's rejections more in the other-agency (M = 76.45, SD = 21.85) than 
in the situational control condition (M = 53.61, SD = 26.59), t(108.62) = 5.14, p < .001, 95% 
CI [-31.64, -14.02]. Additionally, there was a trend for subjects to blame bad 
circumstances more in the situational control condition (M = 72.76, SD = 25.78) than in 
the other-agency condition (M = 64.72, SD = 27.25), t(121.78) = 1.69, p = .09, 95% CI [-
1.39, 17.47]. As in Study 1, subjects thought that it was Brian’s fault more in the 
situational control condition (M = 54.68, SD = 28.17) than in the other-agency condition 
(M = 35.16, SD = 27.56), t(115.17) = 3.83, p < .001, 95% CI [9.41, 29.63]. There was no 
difference in appraisals that college admissions’ was to blame between the situational 
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control condition (M = 33.39, SD = 27.36) and the other-agency condition (M = 33.69, SD 
= 27.26), t(113.83) = .06, p = .95, 95% CI [-10.36, 9.74]. 
 Indirect effect of condition on emotions through appraisals. As in Study 1, we 
tested whether the difference in anger by condition was mediated by appraisals. We 
used the lavaan package in R (Rosseel, 2012) to test for mediation using 10,000 bootstrap 
samples (Hayes, 2012). Once again, there was an indirect effect of experimental 
condition on anger through appraisals that Andrew was responsible, 95% bias-
corrected CI [1.65, 10.58], though there was still a direct effect of condition on anger, 
95% bias-corrected CI [3.70, 21.32]. 
Did Perceptions of Brian’s Emotions Cause Subjects’ Vicarious Emotions? 
 As in Study 1, we examined whether the differences in subjects’ own emotions 
by condition were matched by differences in their perceptions of Brian’s emotions. For 
the open-ended responses, there were eight emotion groups with 10 or more 
observations: anger, sadness, confusion, regret, general unpleasantness, surprise, and 
incompetence. Although feelings of incompetence are not commonly studied in 
emotion research, it is a common experience in real life and subjects mentioned it 
frequently.   
 Open-Ended Data. Over 90% of the subjects in both conditions thought that 
Brian felt sad. There was no difference in the proportion of subjects who thought that 
Brian felt sad between the situational control (93%) and the other-agency condition 
(91%), B = .17, SE = .35, Z = .50, p = .62, 95% CI [-.48, .87]. In contrast to subjects’ own 
anger, there was no difference in the proportion of subjects who thought that Brian felt 
angry between the situational control condition (17%) and the other-agency condition 
(9%), B = .35, SE = .28, Z = 1.26, p = .21, 95% CI [-.18, .92]. These results fail to support 
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the alternative explanation that differences in subjects’ anger was due to differences in 
their perceptions of Brian’s emotions. 
 There was only one difference in subjects’ perceptions of Brian’s emotions: they 
were more likely to say that Brian was surprised in the other-agency condition (17%) 
than in the situational control condition (5%), B = -.67, SE = .34, Z = 1.97, p = .049, 95% 
CI [-1.43, -.05]. 
 Closed-Ended Data. The items angry and mad (r = .73) were averaged to 
measure anger and the items sad and down (r = .52) were averaged to measure sadness. 
There were six outliers for perceptions that Andrew felt sad (within-group studentized 
residuals with an absolute value greater than 3); these observations were excluded from 
analyses, but we report the results of the analysis when they are retained as well. 
 Similar to Study 1, there was a trend for subjects to perceive that Brian was 
angrier in the situational control condition (M = 59.73, SD = 22.99) than in the other-
agency condition (M = 52.16, SD = 22.14), t(121.97) = 1.79, p = .08, 95% CI [-15.95, .81], 
which is in the opposite direction of the differences in their own anger by condition. 
This result means that the differences in subjects’ own anger by condition were not due 
to perceptions that Brian was angry. 
 Unlike Study 1, there was a trend for subjects to perceive that Brian was sadder 
in the situational control condition (M = 94.21, SD = 8.74) than in the other-agency 
condition (M = 91.15, SD = 9.20), t(116.87) = 1.86, p = .07, 95% CI [-6.32, .20].7 When 
perceptions of Brian’s sadness was added to the model predicting subjects’ own 
sadness, there was an indirect effect of condition on subjects’ own sadness through their 
perceptions of Brian’s sadness, 95% bias-corrected CI [-3.71, -.10] and there was no 
direct effect of condition on subjects’ sadness, 95% bias-corrected CI [-11.86, 1.12]. This 
result is consistent with theories that predict emotion matching. 
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 Correlations Between Own Emotions and Perceptions of Brian’s Emotions. As 
in Study 1, we examined the individual-level correlations between subjects’ emotions 
and their perceptions of Brian’s emotions. Once again, there was no correlation between 
subjects’ own anger and their perceptions of Brian’s anger (r = .03, p = .91). Unlike 
Study 1, subjects who felt sadder also thought that Brian felt sadder (r = .29, p < .001). 
Study 2 Discussion 
 In Study 2, we replicated the major finding from Study 1 that subjects’ vicarious 
anger had to do with their appraisals of agency for the other person’s misfortune. Once 
again, there was no evidence that they felt angry through some contagious process. 
 Unlike Study 1, there were no differences in sadness and sympathy by condition 
in either the open-ended or closed-ended emotion data. In addition, although there was 
no evidence that an emotion-matching process made subjects feel vicariously angry, 
some of the data were consistent with the idea that an emotion-matching process made 
subjects feel sad. 
 General Discussion  
 Sometimes we feel emotions for others that match what they feel and we 
experience empathy. At other times we feel emotions for them that do not match what 
they feel. We hypothesized that emotions for others are based on appraisals of their 
situations. This perspective applies to both matching and non-matching vicarious 
emotions and treats empathy as a special case of a general emotional appraisal process. 
 The results of the two studies provide initial support for appraisal as a process 
that is involved in vicarious emotions, which was the primary goal of the research. 
Subjects in the other-agency condition were angrier than those in the situational control 
condition in both the open-ended and closed-ended emotion data. The appraisal that 
Brian’s friend was to blame mediated the effects of experimental condition on anger. 
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Additionally, there was some evidence that subjects in the situational control condition 
were sadder than those in the other-agency condition, although this difference was 
inconsistent across two studies and the two sources of emotion reports.  
 Some theories of empathy argue that perceiving a target’s emotional state causes 
empathic emotions (Gallese, 2003; Keysers & Gazzola, 2009; Preston, 2007; Preston & de 
Waal, 2002). These theories do not predict the appraisal-based differences in anger that 
we observed. Instead, they predict that what we feel for others should match what we 
think they feel. In contrast, we found some evidence that the opposite was true: subjects 
in the other-agency condition, who felt angrier than those in the situational control 
condition, thought that Brian was less angry. Additionally, there was no correlation 
between subjects’ own anger and their perceptions of Brian’s anger. 
 Our secondary goal was to try to examine vicarious sadness and situational 
control. This goal was less successful due to the variability in the results across the two 
studies. One reason for this is that we did not find differences in the appraisal of 
situational control, which differentiates sadness (and fear) from other negative emotions 
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 
2007; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Our main goal was to change appraisals of other-agency 
to make subjects feel vicarious anger that Brian didn’t feel. To keep the two conditions 
as parallel as possible, our second condition had Brian deliver the same letter that 
Andrew had him write in the first condition. Although we hoped that subjects would 
take Brian’s disadvantage into account and blame his circumstances, they still tended to 
blame him. Future research on vicarious sadness and appraisal might be more 
successful by using scenarios that have less of a risk that subjects will blame the target. 
 Nevertheless, in Study 2 there was evidence that subjects’ perceptions of Brian’s 
sadness were responsible for their own feelings of sadness. It’s possible that by listening 
 99 
to the radio show instead of reading it, subjects had a more salient representation of 
Brian’s sadness that was better able to activate the same state in themselves (Preston & 
Hofelich, 2012). In that case, a perception-action process may have been involved in 
subjects’ sadness separately from the appraisal process that was involved in their anger. 
If Brian had expressed strong anger instead, then the perception-action process might 
have been more involved in subjects’ anger and appraisal might have been more 
involved in their sadness. 
 Alternatively, there might be something specific about sadness that elicits similar 
emotions from observers. In particular, signs of vulnerability can encourage feelings of 
tenderness and concern, even in the absence of a misfortune (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & 
Sawyer, 2005; Lishner, Batson, & Huss, 2011). In appraisal theories, this has to do with 
appraisals of low coping potential (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Lazarus, 1991). When 
someone expresses sadness, this can signal their vulnerability and inability to cope with 
a misfortune. Whatever the cause of Brian’s rejections, the impact on his future was the 
same, and there was nothing he could do about it. Future research should explore the 
role of appraisals of situational agency and appraisals of low coping potential in 
vicarious sadness and sympathy. 
 This is the first test of the appraisal approach to vicarious emotions, and many 
questions remain. One clear direction for future research is to go beyond agency to 
examine other appraisal dimensions, and to examine other vicarious emotional 
experiences. Do people feel non-matching vicarious emotions when they differ in their 
appraisals of certainty (e.g., the other person thinks the situation is hopeless but you 
think there’s a chance of success) or control (e.g., the other person thinks her 
precautions are sufficient but you have your doubts) or morality (e.g., the other person 
thinks something immoral is going on but you you think it’s just a cultural difference)?  
 100 
 Our choice to examine appraisals of agency makes our predictions from 
perspectives on appraisal akin to predictions from perspectives in moral psychology. 
For example, Gray and Wegner (2011) argued that those who perpetuate harm ("moral 
agents") should elicit moral anger, just as appraisal theories predict that appraisals that 
someone else is to blame for an unpleasant situation should elicit anger. Many 
situations in which we feel vicarious emotions involve moral judgments of benefits or 
harms, and Scherer’s component process model includes an appraisal of compatibility 
with norms (Scherer, 1984; Scherer, 2013). Nevertheless, appraisal theories don't deal 
with what makes people develop norms about morality in the first place and moral 
psychology doesn't deal with vicarious emotions in situations that don't involve moral 
goods and ills. Future research can emphasize this point by manipulating appraisals 
other than agency. For example, when something bad happens that was not caused by 
another person, appraisals of certainty differentiate sadness from fear (Ellsworth & 
Smith, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). If subjects receive information that a target’s 
misfortune is certain, then the theory predicts that they should feel sad, but if the 
misfortune is uncertain, then they should feel  anxious.  
 The experiment was rooted in an expanded view of appraisal theories of emotion 
(Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Wondra & Ellsworth, in press). Some appraisal theorists 
have emphasized that emotions are about personal goals and prioritized appraisals of 
the motivational relevance and motivational congruence of situations (Frijda, 1988; 
Lazarus & Smith, 1988). This perspective makes vicarious emotions a problem because 
there doesn't seem to be a personal goal at stake. Other appraisal theorists have argued 
that situations can be appraised as pleasant or unpleasant even if no personal goals are 
at stake (Scherer, 1984; Scherer, 2013; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Although these latter 
perspectives don't exclude the possibility of vicarious emotions, they have not said 
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much about vicarious emotions either. We are happy to expand empirical research on 
specific dimensions of appraisal to vicarious emotions.  
 Whether we feel vicarious emotions for others, and what we feel, depends on 
who the other person is. We are more motivated to empathize with some people than 
others (Zaki, 2014), and a number of studies have demonstrated that people empathize 
more with others who share their group membership (e.g., Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, 
& Saxe, 2014; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). One possibility is 
that people are motivated to make favorable appraisals of the situation for others whom 
they like and to make unfavorable appraisals for others whom they dislike. If a friend 
experiences some misfortune, you might blame the situation, but when an enemy 
experiences the same misfortune, you might blame the victim. Future research can 
explore whether motivated appraising contributes to differences in vicarious emotions 
for friends, strangers, and enemies.    
Conclusion 
 The results of this experiment provide initial support for two general points 
about emotions for others. First, appraisals of others’ situations can affect our emotions 
for others regardless of what we think they are feeling. Second, appraisal theories 
suggest processes that have the potential to explain both matching and non-matching 
emotions for others instead of focusing on matching as a special case. An appraisal 
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Using Others’ Emotion Expressions to Appraise Their Situations:  




Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a 
certain emotion in another person... Grief and joy, for example, strongly 
expressed in the look and gestures of any one, at once affect the spectator with 
some degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion... If the very appearances of 
grief and joy inspire us with some degree of the like emotions, it is because they 
suggest to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen the 
person in whom we observe them: and in these passions this is sufficient to have 
some little influence upon us.  
— Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759  
 
When an observer sees someone cry or smile, it can infect her with a similar 
sadness or joy. This idea, that an observer can “catch” others’ emotions, has been 
referred to as emotion contagion, which is treated by some as a synonym for empathy 
and by others as a precursor to empathy. One theoretical explanation for emotion 
contagion is rooted in the mimicry of emotion expressions (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & 
Rapson, 1994; Hoffman, 2000, pp. 37–45). Through this process, when an observer sees 
someone else’s lips pulled up in a smile, or the inner eyebrows raised in a look of sad 
concern, she automatically mimics those expressions, and by mimicking the expression 
she feels the associated emotion. From this perspective, the perception of someone else’s 
emotion expression can make the observer feel the same emotion.  
However, as Adam Smith suggests in the opening quote, an alternative 
possibility is that when an observer sees someone else smile or frown, she uses the 
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expression to infer a likely situation, and by inferring their likely situation, she comes to 
feel a similar emotion. From this perspective, it is not the perception of the other’s 
emotion expression, but the perception of their situation that makes the observer feel 
the same emotion. Inferring someone’s situation from their emotion expression has 
been called backtracking (Elfenbein, 2007). The backtracking explanation for emotion 
contagion fits appraisal theories of emotion and empathy (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; 
Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015), which propose that emotions are based on how we 
evaluate, or appraise, situations, whether they are emotions we feel for ourselves or 
emotions we feel for others.  
The present research investigates how observers’ vicarious emotional responses 
are affected by others’ emotion expressions. Specifically, do observers simply mimic the 
expression, or do they backtrack and appraise the inferred situation? Let us begin by 
reviewing the evidence for mimicry. 
Mimicry as an Explanation for Emotion Contagion 
Mimicry is supposed to cause emotion contagion through a two-step process 
(Hoffman, 2000; Hatfield et al., 1994). The first step is imitation: when an observer 
perceives a target’s emotion expression, it causes him to automatically imitate the 
expression. The second step is feedback: the observer’s imitated expression produces 
afferent feedback, which causes him to feel the emotion that is associated with the 
expression. The focus of the present research is on the first step, imitation of others’ 
emotion expressions, and so I will review past research on imitation, but not on the 
second step, feedback.  
The first step in mimicry is the automatic imitation of others’ emotion 
expressions. To provide evidence for automatic imitation, empirical research must 
demonstrate that an observer is more likely to perform a specific behavior when he sees 
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a target express the same behavior than when he sees the target express a different 
behavior. For example, an observer should be more likely to smile if he sees the target 
smile than if he sees the target frown. Although this evidence is necessary to 
demonstrate automatic imitation, it is insufficient, because not all imitation is 
automatic, and not all automatic expressions are imitations. For example, when an 
observer sees someone else smile, he might intentionally smile back because he wants to 
be friendly, which would be imitation but not necessarily automatic, or he might 
unintentionally smile back because he feels happy for the other person, which would be 
automatic but not imitation.  
When the term “automatic” is used to describe imitation, it likely means that 
imitation is stimulus-driven (for other features that make a psychological process 
automatic, see Bargh, 1994; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Moors and De Houwer (2006) 
defined a stimulus-driven process as one that is engaged by the presence of a stimulus 
without the need for awareness, attention, or the intention to engage in the process. In 
the case of imitation, the stimulus is the target’s expressive behavior, whose presence 
causes the observer to express the same behavior (without awareness, attention, or 
intention). This feature is what makes mimicry different from backtracking. With 
mimicry, the presence of a target’s smiling face is enough to make an observer smile. 
With backtracking, the observer must also infer what the smile says about the target’s 
situation. This is not to say that backtracking is not automatic. It might be automatic in 
other ways, if it occurs rapidly, unintentionally, and with few demands on attention. If 
someone is crying, it doesn’t take much to infer that something bad happened.  
So to find evidence of automatic, stimulus-driven mimicry, empirical research 
must show (1) that an observer is more likely to perform some behavior when he sees a 
target perform the same behavior than when he sees the target perform a different 
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behavior, and (2) that the observer’s behavior is caused by the presence of the target’s 
behavior, and does not require further mental processing.  
One promising area of research is imitation in newborn infants. If infants imitate 
someone else’s facial expressions, then it is most likely caused by the presence of the 
other’s expression, because infants lack the experience they would need to make sense 
of the expression. In support of automatic imitation, two well-known studies found that 
12- to 21-day-old infants were more likely to make facial gestures (lip protrusion, 
tongue protrusion, mouth opening) after an adult experimenter made the same gesture 
than after the experimenter made a different gesture (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). Later 
research found that even younger infants (average age of 36 hours) were more likely to 
make happy, sad, and surprised facial expressions after an adult experimenter made the 
same expression than after the experimenter made a different expression (Field, 
Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982).  
Although this research is sometimes cited as evidence that imitation is automatic, 
this point is unclear in at least one respect—the speed of imitation. The displays of the 
gestures, and the test periods when imitation was measured, were relatively long (e.g., 
20-second response periods; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), meaning that the infants might 
not have responded for a relatively long time. Notably, the same limitation exists in 
studies where infants cried after they heard the cries of another infant (Sagi & Hoffman, 
1976; Simner, 1971). In those studies, the infants were exposed to the cries for six 
minutes, and the average time before they cried was 1.5 minutes or longer. If the 
responses were automatic, one would expect them to be more immediate.  
Whether it’s automatic or not, subsequent research has produced mixed evidence 
for infant imitation and led to a debate about its existence (for a recent review see 
Oostenbroek, Slaughter, Nielsen, & Suddendorf, 2013). Furthermore, a recent study, 
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which had one of the largest samples and the most comprehensive set of control 
conditions, found no evidence that infants imitate facial gestures, and found that 
previous evidence for imitation might only have been found because past studies 
lacked the right control conditions (Oostenbroek et al., 2016). Pertinent to emotion 
mimicry, the infants were no more likely to make emotional faces when an adult 
experimenter made the same face than when the experimenter made a different face.  
Even if mimicry is not innate from infancy, it could emerge by adulthood 
(through maturation or learning) as an automatic, stimulus-driven response to others’ 
expressions. Many studies find that when adults see emotional faces they respond with 
similar facial expressions (e.g., Blairy, Herrera, & Hess, 1999; Dimberg & Petterson, 
2000; Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012; Krumhuber, Likowski, & Weyers, 2013; Weyers, 
Mühlberger, Hefele, & Pauli, 2006). Frequently, this research uses facial 
electromyography (EMG) to measure the activity of facial muscles, particularly the 
zygomaticus major (zygomaticus for the sake of brevity), which pulls the corners of the 
lips up during smiles, and the corrugator supercilii (corrugator for the sake of brevity), 
which pulls the brows together during frowns, though sometimes the activity of other 
muscles is measured. 
To find evidence of emotion mimicry in EMG studies, subjects must have more 
activity in a facial muscle when they observe emotion expressions that use the muscle 
than when they view expressions that do not use it. Most studies look for greater 
zygomaticus activity when subjects see happy faces and greater corrugator activity 
when they see angry faces. These facial responses happen as early as 500ms after the 
emotional faces appear (Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012), can 
happen when participants are unaware of the emotional faces (Dimberg, Thunberg, & 
Elmehed, 2000), and are at least somewhat uncontrollable (Dimberg, Thunberg, & 
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Grunedal, 2002). These results are consistent with the theory that people mimic others’ 
emotion expressions, and that mimicry is at least somewhat automatic. However, there 
are alternative explanations. Specifically, facial responses to emotional faces might 
reflect not mimicry of the expression, but the observer’s emotions. And part of the 
observer’s emotions might be a vicarious response from backtracking.  
Backtracking as Another Explanation for Emotion Contagion 
Most of the EMG evidence for facial mimicry has compared zygomaticus and 
corrugator responses when subjects see happy and angry faces. This is a problem 
because the corrugator is used to not only make angry expressions, but also sad and 
fearful expressions. Thus, in a comprehensive review of the research on emotion 
mimicry, Hess and Fischer (2013, 2014) pointed out that there is limited evidence that 
people mimic specific emotion expressions, and more evidence that people smile when 
they see happy faces and frown when they see negative emotional faces. In this case, 
observers’ facial responses might reflect an emotional reaction to the emotional faces, 
positive to happy faces and negative to negative faces, and not just mimicry of the 
expression. For example, when subjects see angry faces (but not neutral faces), if they 
incidentally feel afraid, they have more activity in the frontalis, the forehead muscle that 
raises the eyes in fear expressions (Moody, McIntosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007). This is 
inconsistent with mimicry, because the frontalis is not active in angry faces, but it’s 
consistent with an emotional reaction of fear to angry faces.  
Observers might also have an empathic emotional reaction to emotional faces, if 
they consider what made the other person emotional in the first place. This hypothesis 
comes from an appraisal theory of vicarious emotions (Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015). 
According to the appraisal theory, an observer will feel a vicarious emotion when she 
appraises a target’s situation as good or bad, at the minimum. Although the observer 
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might not know all the details of the target’s situation from the face alone, she can 
backtrack and infer that if the target is smiling, then something good happened, and if 
the target is frowning, then something bad happened. Based on this minimal appraisal, 
the observer could feel an empathic emotion, and her face would express that empathic 
emotion. Thus, one would expect the observer to show more zygomaticus activity in 
responses to happy faces, because she feels empathic joy for the other person, and 
greater corrugator activity in response to negative faces, because she feels some 
negative empathic emotion for the other person.  
Although mimicry would predict the same pattern of facial activity, the 
backtracking hypothesis reverses the relationship between the observer’s expression 
and vicarious emotion. With mimicry, when an observer sees a target smiling, the 
target’s smile causes her to smile, and her smile causes her vicarious joy. With 
backtracking, when an observer sees a target smiling, she infers that something good 
happened, her appraisal that something good happened causes her vicarious joy, and 
her vicarious joy causes her smile.  
Testing the Backtracking Hypothesis 
Both mimicry and backtracking predict more zygomaticus activity in response to 
happy faces and more corrugator activity in response to negative faces. How do we test 
whether the facial responses come from backtracking and not just mimicry? One way to 
test the backtracking hypothesis is to change how observers backtrack from emotional 
faces to the situations that caused them.  
Observers might typically assume that others’ emotion expressions are reliable 
signs of the situations that caused them, so if they see someone smiling, they assume 
that something good happened. But if this assumption is violated, then it might change 
the observers’ inferences. For example, the observer might learn that a target gets 
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excited about things that are not very exciting. What would happen when the observer 
sees the same target smile later? According to stimulus-driven mimicry, the observer 
should smile back just as much, because it is the presence of the target’s expression that 
causes the observer’s expression. According to the backtracking hypothesis, the 
observer should smile back less, because the observer will distrust that the smile means 
that something truly good happened to the target. 
I tested the backtracking hypothesis by having subjects watch a video of a young 
woman who was excited about her romantic relationship. In the video, she revealed 
that she had been dating her partner for two years, or that she had been dating her 
partner for one week. Then subjects saw images of her with happy expressions, neutral 
expressions, and sad expressions. Subjects’ facial expressions were measured using 
EMG. I predicted that when subjects saw the woman get excited about a one-week 
relationship, they would distrust that her smiles were a sign that something good 
happened, and when they saw her happy expressions vs. sad expressions, their own 
expressions would be less happy. 
Overview of the Research 
Subjects watched a video interview of a young woman named Meredith who 
was overjoyed about her relationship with her boyfriend, Nick. In the middle of the 
video, Meredith revealed that the relationship had lasted for two years or for one week, 
but she expressed the same joy about it either way. I predicted that subjects would think 
a one-week relationship was less exciting than a two-year relationship, and those who 
thought Meredith was excited about a one-week relationship would distrust that her 
smiles were a sign that something good happened to her.  
After watching the video, subjects saw images of Meredith with happy, neutral, 
and sad expressions. Their facial muscle activity was measured with electromyography 
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(EMG). I predicted that when subjects saw the happy faces vs. sad faces, they would 
have more muscle activity in the zygomaticus major (for brevity, zygomaticus), the 
muscle that pulls the lips back in a smile, and less activity in the corrugator supercilii (for 
brevity, corrugator), the muscle that pulls the eyebrows together in a frown.8 Based on 
the backtracking hypothesis, I predicted that these differences in muscle activity would 
be smaller when subjects believed Meredith was excited about a one-week relationship. 
In other words, if she was excited about a one-week relationship, subjects would 
distrust that her smiles were a sign that something good happened, and they would be 
less likely to smile back at her smiles. 
There were two pilot studies. The purpose of the first pilot study was to make 
sure that the videos changed how subjects backtracked from Meredith’s happy 
expressions to her situation. The purpose of the second pilot study was to make sure 
that without the videos, subjects’ “mimicked” Meredith’s happy and sad expressions.  
Pilot Study 1: Changing How Subjects Backtrack from Happy Expressions 
 To test the backtracking hypothesis, it was important to make sure that the 
videos changed how subjects backtracked from Meredith’s expressions to her situation. 
Specifically, I predicted that after subjects watched her get excited about a one-week 
relationship vs. a two-year relationship, when they saw her smile again, they would 
infer that her situation wasn’t as good. 
Method  
                                                             
8 The difference in corrugator activity can reflect relaxation of the corrugator in response 
to happy faces rather than contraction of the corrugator in response to sad faces, 
because subjects concentrate and contract the corrugator as they prepare for the faces to 
appear (e.g., Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012; Dimberg et al., 
2000). 
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Pilot subjects were approached in public locations on the University of Michigan 
campus. They watched a video with headphones on a mobile phone and completed a 
paper survey. Data were excluded from one subject because he knew the actress in the 
video, and from another because the experimenter made a procedural error.  
The video showed a young woman named Meredith who was interviewed about 
her romantic relationship. Each interview question appeared on a black screen before 
Meredith answered. She answered questions about her name and her partner’s name, 
how they met, and how the relationship makes her feel. Then she revealed that they had 
been dating for two years (n = 22) or for one week (n = 21):  
How long ago did your relationship begin?  
So we got together a couple weeks after me and my last boyfriend broke up after 
a year-long relationship. So we’ve been together for two years now (for about a 
week).  
 
Finally, she described how excited she was to think about her future with Nick.  
 
Where do you see your relationship heading in the future?  
Ahhh. . . I just. . . I really think that he’s the one. He makes me so happy and I 
just get so excited imagining what the rest of our life is going to be like together. I 
just. . . I can’t believe that I found my soulmate. I really think that he’s the one 
and it makes me so happy. I think I’m going to be with him forever—it feels like 
that. I. . . I think I’ve found the one.  
 
After they watched the video, subjects completed a survey. On the first page, they saw 
images of Meredith with different emotion expressions. They were told that these 
images came from other parts of the interview, when Meredith was talking about topics 
that were different from what they had watched her talk about. The images showed her 
with a happy face, a sad face, and a neutral face (two of each). The sad and neutral faces 
were included to hide the fact that the research was about their reactions to her happy 
faces. Subjects were asked to consider what Meredith might have been talking about 
when each image was taken, to rate how good or bad she thought it was, and to rate 
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how good or bad they would think it was (-4 = extremely bad, 0 = neutral, 4 = extremely 
good). Backtracking was measured as how good or bad they would think it was. 
On the second page, subjects rated how good or bad they thought Meredith felt 
in the video, how good or bad they thought the situation was, and how appropriate her 
emotion expression was (-4 = extremely bad/inappropriate, 0 = neutral, 4 = extremely 
good/appropriate).  
Results  
When subjects saw Meredith’s happy faces, they thought whatever she was 
talking about was not as good in the one-week condition (M = 2.08, SD = 0.95) as in the 
two-years condition (M = 2.82, SD = 0.75), t(37.96) = 2.8, p = 0.01, 95% CI [0.2, 1.27]. This 
means that the manipulation successfully changed the way subjects backtracked from 
her emotion expressions—if she got excited about a one-week relationship, when they 
saw her smile again, they inferred that her situation wasn’t as good. 
In contrast, when subjects saw Meredith’s sad faces, they thought whatever she 
was talking about was just as bad in the one-week condition (M = -1.88, SD = 1.23) as in 
the two-years condition (M = -1.84, SD = 0.68), t(28.93) = 0.11, p = 0.91, 95% CI [-0.6, 
0.67]. Similarly, when subjects saw Meredith’s neutral faces, there was no difference in 
their perceptions of what she was talking about in the one-week condition (M = -0.43, 
SD = 0.73) and the two-years condition (M = -0.32, SD = 0.5), t(35.26) = 0.58, p = 0.57, 
95% CI [-0.28, 0.5]. This suggests that, although the videos changed how subjects 
backtracked from her happy expressions to her situation, it did not change how they 
backtracked from her sad or neutral expressions. 
In addition, subjects thought that Meredith’s situation wasn’t as good in the one-
week condition (M = 1.95, SD = 1.4) as in the two-years condition (M = 3.18, SD = 0.73), 
t(29.94) = 3.59, p = .001, 95% CI [0.53, 1.93], and they thought her emotion expression 
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was less appropriate in the one-week condition (M = 0.81, SD = 0.84) than in the two-
years condition (M = 3.32, SD = 0.84), t(26.96) = 5.46, p < .001, 95% CI [1.57, 3.45]. In 
contrast, subjects thought that Meredith felt just as happy in the in the one-week 
condition (M = 3.43, SD = 1.12) as in the two-years condition (M = 3.77, SD = 0.43), 
t(25.5) = 1.32, p = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.19, 0.88].  
The goal of the videos was to make sure that when subjects saw Meredith get 
excited about a one-week relationship, it would change the way they backtracked from 
her happy expressions, and they would be less likely to think that her smiles were a 
reliable sign that something good happened to her. The results of the pilot study 
confirm that this goal was successful.  
Pilot Study 2: “Mimicry” of the Expressions When Subjects  
Have No Other Information  
 The backtracking hypothesis predicts that people smile less in response to smiles, 
and frown less in response to negative emotional faces, when they have a reason to 
distrust that the expressions are a reliable sign that something good or bad happened. 
To test this hypothesis, it was important to demonstrate that when there was no reason 
to distrust the expressions, subjects would “mimic” them. I predicted that when 
subjects saw the images of Meredith with emotional expressions (but did not watch the 
videos), they would have more activity in the zygomaticus, the muscle that pulls the 
cheeks back in a smile, and less activity in the corrugator, the muscle that pulls the 
brows together in a frown, when they saw her happy faces than when they saw her sad 
faces. 
Method 
Subjects. Pilot subjects were 24 undergraduate students who received course 
credit for participation. Data from four additional subjects were excluded from 
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analyses: one suspected the study was about mimicry, two suspected that the sensors 
were tracking their facial movements, and one had a tech failure. Additionally, one 
subject had incomplete data because he touched his face during the study and knocked 
off one of the zygomaticus electrodes; because this changed the psychological 
experience of the study, all data after that point were excluded.  
Procedure. Subjects were told that the study was about emotion perception. They 
would see images from an interview about an emotional experience, and they would try 
to guess how the other person felt when each image was taken. To hide the purpose of 
the EMG sensors, subjects were told they measured sweating on the skin, because their 
physiological reactions could change how they perceived the other person’s emotions.  
Next, subjects were escorted to a room where the EMG sensors were attached to 
the zygomaticus, to the corrugator, and to the middle of the forehead (the grounding 
electrode). Additionally, sensors to measure electrodermal activity were placed on the 
distal phalanges of the middle and ring fingers of the subject’s non-dominant hand 
(these sensors enhanced the cover story, and the electrodermal activity data are not 
discussed further). The EMG sensors were placed on the same side of the face. 
Next, subjects were escorted to a second room where they were introduced to the 
emotion perception task. For each trial of the emotion perception task, subjects saw a 
blank screen for eight seconds, then a fixation cross for one second, then an image of an 
emotional face for eight seconds. There were four images of Meredith with a happy 
expression, four with a sad expression, and four with a neutral expression, and each 
image was displayed twice and in random order. After the image disappeared, subjects 
rated how good she felt and how bad she felt (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). The neutral 
expressions and the ratings of how good and bad she felt were included to enhance the 
cover story, that the study was about emotion perception. 
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Subjects practiced two trials of the emotion perception task with images of 
neutral expressions. Then the experimenter left the room and the subjects completed the 
emotion perception task. Once they finished the emotion perception task, they 
completed a short demographics questionnaire. Finally, subjects were debriefed. 
EMG Processing. EMG data were collected with bipolar electrodes from the 
zygomaticus and corrugator, with a single ground electrode in the middle of the 
forehead, according to the guidelines of Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). The skin at the 
EMG sites was prepared by wiping it with alcohol and an abrasive pad. Biopac 4mm-
diameter Ag/AgCl cup electrodes were filled with Parker Laboratories Signagel 
electrode gel and placed at each EMG site using adhesive disks. Electrodes at each 
muscle site were spaced 1.5cm apart. Interelectrode impedance was checked, and if it 
was above 10 k!, attempts were made to reduce it to 10 k! or less by cleaning the skin 
again. A Biopac Dual Wireless EMG BioNomadix model BN-EMG2 was used to record 
EMG signals at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. The data were subsequently filtered with a 
30-500-Hz bandpass filter and a 60-Hz notch filter.  
The filtered EMG data were full-wave rectified and integrated over 20ms and 
200ms epochs for different methods of analysis (see Results for details). During the 
study, subjects were surreptitiously video-recorded. Research assistants watched the 
videos to code behavioral artifacts that were unrelated to the phenomenon of interest 
(e.g., yawning, pursing lips, touching the face). The EMG data were set to missing in 
epochs that included an artifact (7% of the epochs during the periods that were used in 
data analysis).  
Results 
There is no standard way to analyze EMG data in studies of facial mimicry, and 
different labs used different methods. The decisions that researchers make about how to 
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process and analyze the data are not trivial, and they can lead to different statistical and 
psychological conclusions. Because there is no standard, I chose to replicate the 
methods that are used in three different labs. I predicted that subjects would have more 
zygomaticus activity and less corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when 
they saw sad faces. 
Analyses based on Dimberg and colleagues. The first method of analysis was 
based on the procedure that is typically used by Dimberg and colleagues (e.g., Dimberg 
& Petterson, 2000). The rectified EMG data were integrated over 20ms epochs.  
To plot the data, during the first second after each image appeared, the 
integrated EMG data were averaged into ten 100ms periods. During the first second 
before each image appeared (during the fixation cross), the integrated EMG data were 
averaged to create a baseline. This baseline was subtracted from each 100ms period in 
the trial.  
To analyze the data, during the first second after each image appeared, the 
integrated EMG data were averaged from 0-500ms and from 500-1000ms. This made it 
possible to separately analyze muscle activity during the first 500ms and during the 
second 500ms. 
Zygomaticus. Figure IV.1 displays subjects’ average zygomaticus activity during 
the first second that they saw the happy, neutral, and sad faces. On average, subjects 
had more zygomaticus activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad 
faces during every 100ms period of the first second, but this difference was not 
significant overall, t(23) = 1.3, p = 0.21, 95% CI [-.009, .039], during the first 500ms, t(23) 
= 1.26, p = .22, 95% CI [-.005, .022], or during the second 500ms, t(23) = 1.26, p = .22, 95% 
CI [-.004, .018]. There was no difference in zygomaticus activity when subjects saw 
happy faces and neutral faces overall, t(23) = .29, p = .78, 95% CI [-.012, .016], during the 
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first 500ms, t(23) = .34, p = .74, 95% CI [-.007, .010], or during the second 500ms, t(23) = 
.14, p = .89, 95% CI [-.007, .008]. In summary, although the pattern was in the predicted 
direction, with more zygomaticus activity when subjects saw happy faces than when 
they saw sad faces, the differences were not statistically significant.   
 
Figure IV.1. Average zygomaticus major activity during the first second that subjects 
saw happy, neutral, and sad faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses are 
based on a procedure from Dimberg and colleagues (e.g., Dimberg & Petterson, 2000). 
 
Corrugator. Figure IV.2 displays subjects’ average corrugator activity during the 
first second that they saw the happy, neutral, and sad faces. On average, subjects had 
less corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces, t(23) 
= 2.07, p = .0496, 95% CI [-.023, -.00002], which primarily occurred during the second 
500ms, t(23) = 3.11, p = .005, 95% CI [-.020, -.004], and not during the first 500ms, t(23) = 
.22, p = .83, 95% CI [-.004, .005]. This difference during the second 500ms was due to a 
greater decrease in corrugator activity from the baseline when subjects saw happy faces, 
t(23) = 2.56, p = .02, 95% CI [-.019, -.002], and not due to an increase in activity when 
they saw sad faces, t(23) = .69, p = .50, 95% CI [-.003, .006]. There was no difference in 
corrugator activity when subjects saw sad and neutral faces overall, t(23) = .80, p = .43, 
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95% CI [-.03, .01], during the first 500ms, t(23) = 1.04, p = .31, 95% CI [-.029, .010], or 
during the second 500ms, t(23) = .34, p = .74, 95% CI [-.007, .009]. In summary, the data 
supported the prediction that subjects would have less corrugator activity when they 
saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces.  
 
Figure IV.2. Average corrugator supercilii activity during the first second that subjects 
saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses are 
based on a procedure from Dimberg and colleagues (e.g., Dimberg & Petterson, 2000). 
 
Analyses based on Moody and colleagues. The second method of analysis was 
based on a procedure from Moody and colleagues (Moody, McIntosh, Mann, & 
Weisser, 2007). The method is similar to the method from Dimberg and colleagues, but 
with two differences. First, the integrated EMG data were log10-transformed and 
standardized within participant and muscle. Second, the baseline was the average 
integrated EMG activity during the last 500ms before stimulus onset (during the second 
half of the fixation cross) instead of during the last second. 
Zygomaticus. Figure IV.3 displays subjects’ average zygomaticus activity during 
the first second that they saw the happy, neutral, and sad faces. Note that the choice of 
analytic method has consequences. Using this method, on average, subjects had greater 
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zygomaticus activity when they saw neutral faces than when they saw happy faces at 
all but two of the 100ms periods. This pattern did not match the one from the method of 
Dimberg and colleagues. 
 
Figure IV.3. Average zygomaticus major activity during the first second that subjects 
saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses are 
based on a procedure from Moody et al. (2007). 
 
On average, subjects had more zygomaticus activity when they saw happy faces 
than when they saw sad faces during every 100ms period of the first second, but this 
difference was not significant overall, t(23) = 1.45, p = 0.16, 95% CI [-.015, .087], during 
the first 500ms, t(23) = 1.03, p = .32, 95% CI [-.012, .037], or during the second 500ms, 
t(23) = 1.65, p = .11, 95% CI [-.006, .054]. There was no difference in zygomaticus activity 
when subjects saw happy faces and neutral faces overall, t(23) = .57, p = .57, 95% CI [-
.056, .032], during the first 500ms, t(23) = .99, p = .33, 95% CI [-.026, .009], or during the 
second 500ms, t(23) = .25, p = .80, 95% CI [-.034, .026]. In summary, although the pattern 
was in the predicted direction, with more zygomaticus activity when subjects saw 
happy faces than when they saw sad faces, the differences were not statistically 
significant. 
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Corrugator. Figure IV.4 displays subjects’ average corrugator activity during the 
first second that they saw the sad, neutral, and happy faces. On average, subjects had 
less corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces, t(23) 
= 3.40, p = 0.002, 95% CI [-.205, -.026], which primarily occurred during the second 
500ms, t(23) = 4.26, p < .001, 95% CI [-.087, -.030], and not during the first 500ms, t(23) = 
.88, p = .39, 95% CI [-.023, .009]. As Figure IV.4 shows, this difference during the second 
500ms was due to a drop from the baseline when subjects saw happy faces, t(23) = 3.50, 
p = .002, 95% CI [-.073, -.019] and not due to an increase from the baseline when subjects 
saw sad faces, t(23) = 1.40, p = .18, 95% CI [-.006, .031]. There was no difference in 
corrugator activity when subjects saw sad and neutral faces overall, t(23) = .58, p = .57, 
95% CI [-.018, .032], during the first 500ms, t(23) = .72, p = .48, 95% CI [-.021, .010], or 
during the second 500ms, t(23) = 1.69, p = .11, 95% CI [-.003, .028]. In summary, the data 
supported the prediction that subjects would have less corrugator activity when they 
saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces. 
 
Figure IV.4. Average corrugator supercilii activity during the first second that subjects 
saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses are 
based on a procedure from Moody et al. (2007). 
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Analyses based on Bourgeois and Hess. The third method of analysis was based 
on a procedure from Bourgeois and Hess (2008). This method departs from the previous 
methods in a few ways. First, the EMG data were integrated over 200ms epochs instead 
of 20ms epochs. Second, the EMG data were standardized within participants and 
muscle, but there was no log-transformation. Third, there was no subtraction from a 
baseline. Fourth, the EMG data were averaged over the entire eight-second period that 
subjects saw the images instead of during just the first second. I made one departure 
from the procedure of Bourgeois and Hess: they sampled their EMG data at 20 Hz, but 
the data from the pilot study were sampled at 1000 Hz. It seemed unreasonable to 
discard data to match their sampling rate. 
Zygomaticus. Figure IV.5 displays subjects’ average zygomaticus activity when 
they saw happy, neutral, and sad faces. Unlike the prior analyses, on average subjects 
had less zygomaticus activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad 
faces, though the difference was not significant, t(23) = .59, p = 0.56, 95% CI [-.156, .086]. 
There was no difference in zygomaticus activity when subjects saw happy faces and 




Figure IV.5. Average zygomaticus major activity during the whole period that subjects 
saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses are 
based on a procedure from Bourgeois & Hess (2008). 
 
Corrugator. Figure IV.6 displays subjects’ average corrugator activity when they 
saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. Similar to the previous analyses, on average subjects 
had less corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces, 
t(23) = 3.33, p = .003, 95% CI [-.198, -.046]. There was no difference in corrugator activity 
when subjects saw sad and neutral faces, t(23) = .73, p = .47, 95% CI [-.044, .092], but 
they did have less corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw 
neutral faces, t(23) = 3.16, p = .004, 95% CI [-.163, -.034]. Thus, similarly to the previous 
analyses, the differences in corrugator activity seemed to be due to relaxation when 
subjects saw happy faces and not due to contraction when they saw sad faces. 
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Figure IV.6. Average zygomaticus major activity during the entire period that subjects 
saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses are 
based on a procedure from Bourgeois & Hess (2008). 
 
 Summary of results. The purpose of the second pilot study was to make sure 
that the images could produce a “mimicry” effect, where subjects had greater 
zygomaticus activity and less corrugator activity when they saw happy vs. sad faces. 
The procedures of Dimberg and colleagues and Moody and colleagues found a non-
significant trend for more zygomaticus activity when subjects saw happy faces than 
when they saw sad faces. All three procedures found less corrugator activity when 
subjects saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces. These results were imperfect, 
but they were consistent with the predictions, and they were enough to proceed with 
the main study, where a larger sample size would provide more power to detect these 
effects.  
Main Study Method 
 The pilot studies established, first, that the videos changed how subjects 
backtracked from the emotion expression to the situation, and second, that subjects’ 
facial responses to the images of emotional faces fit the typical mimicry effect. In the 
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main study, I tested whether the change in backtracking from the videos would change 
subjects’ facial responses to the emotional faces. Subjects watched the videos of 
Meredith expressing her joy about the two-year relationship or the one-week 
relationship. Then they saw images of her with happy, neutral, and sad faces while their 
facial muscle activity was recorded. I predicted that subjects would have more 
zygomaticus activity and less corrugator activity when they saw happy vs. sad faces. If 
the facial responses are simply mimicry, then these differences should be unaffected by 
the videos. But based on the backtracking hypothesis, I predicted that the differences in 
facial responses to the emotional faces would be smaller when subjects thought 
Meredith was excited about a one-week relationship, because they would infer that her 
happy expressions were a less reliable sign that something good happened to her.  
Subjects 
Subjects were 146 undergraduate students and community members who 
received course credit or $10 for participating in the study. Data from another 22 
subjects were excluded from analysis: eight suspected the sensors were measuring their 
facial expressions, four suspected that the video was fake, four were inattentive or fell 
asleep, two could not hear sound from the video due to a technical failure, one 
recognized the actress, one had poor EMG data quality, one became lightheaded during 
the study due to a medical phobia, and one subject who watched the one-week video 
reported during debriefing that he was African, and due to his cultural background he 
thought there was nothing unusual about someone falling in love and getting married 
after knowing their partner for only a week.  
Procedure 
Subjects were told that the study was about emotion perception.  They were told 
that most studies about emotion perception ask people to guess the emotions of 
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complete strangers, but in everyday life we usually know something about the people 
whose emotions we’re trying to understand. So in the study, subjects would watch a 
video of a participant who was recorded while talking about different emotional 
experiences. They would watch her talk about one of those experiences and then they 
would see images of her from other parts of the interview while she was talking about 
other experiences. They would guess how she felt when the images were taken. As in 
the mimicry pilot study, subjects were also told that sensors measured sweating on the 
skin. The rest of the study was identical to the mimicry pilot with three exceptions.  
First, after subjects practiced the emotion perception task, they were randomly 
assigned to watch the one-week or two-years video.  
Second, in the mimicry pilot study, many subjects would look around the room 
between trials during the blank screen. When the fixation cross appeared, they turned 
their attention back to the computer screen, which caused many behavioral artifacts in 
the EMG data. This was a problem because muscle activity during the fixation cross 
was used as a baseline in two of the methods of analysis. To attenuate this problem, a 
new period was added after the fixation cross, where subjects saw an image of Meredith 
that had her face blurred for one second (and then the emotional face appeared). The 
EMG data during this new period were used as the baseline. 
Third, after the emotion perception task, subjects completed a survey that asked 
them how much they felt happy, cheerful, amused, entertained, irritated, annoyed, 
interested, curious, proud, grateful, sad, down, lonely, jealous, and envious while they 
were watching the video of Meredith at the beginning of the study (slider scale with 0 = 
not at all, 100 = extremely). I analyzed how happy (average of “happy” and “cheerful”), 
amused (average of “amused” and “entertained”), irritated (average of “irritated” and 
“annoyed”), and jealous (average of “jealous” and “envious”) they felt. Amusement, 
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irritation, and jealousy were analyzed because they were emotions that subjects would 
plausibly feel (for example, a couple of participants laughed while they were watching 
the one-week video). 
Subjects were also asked questions about their romantic relationships and their 
beliefs about love; these data were collected for exploratory purposes and are not 
discussed further in this paper.  
Main Study Results 
For the full study, I used the same three methods to analyze the EMG data as in 
the mimicry pilot study. I predicted that subjects would have more zygomaticus activity 
and less corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces, 
and that this difference would be smaller after they watched Meredith get excited about 
a one-week relationship than after they watched her get excited about a two-year 
relationship. If the facial responses are simply stimulus-driven mimicry, then they 
should be unaffected by the videos; however, if the facial responses are at least partially 
driven by backtracking, then they should be weaker for subjects in the one-week 
condition, who should distrust that Meredith’s happy faces are a reliable sign that 
something good happened to her. 
Analyses Based on Dimberg and Colleagues  
Zygomaticus. Figure IV.7 displays subjects’ average zygomaticus activity during 
the first second they saw the happy, neutral, and sad faces. On average, subjects had 
more zygomaticus activity when they saw happy faces than sad faces, t(139) = 2.13, p = 
.04, 95% CI [.001, .019], which occurred during the second 500ms, t(139) = 2.44, p = .02, 
95% CI [.002, .017], but not during the first 500ms, t(142) = .43, p = .67, 95% CI [-.005, 
.007]. On average, this difference was smaller for subjects who saw Meredith get excited 
about a one-week relationship than for those who saw her get excited about a two-year 
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relationship, at least during the second 500ms, but the effect of the videos on the 
difference in zygomaticus activity was not statistically significant either overall, t(139) = 
.25, p = .80, 95% CI [-.021, .016], or during just the second 500ms, t(139) = .44, p = .66, 
95% CI [-.018, .012].  
 
Figure IV.7. Average zygomaticus major activity during the first second that 
subjects saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses 
are based on a procedure from Dimberg and colleagues (e.g., Dimberg & Petterson, 
2000). 
 
Additionally, on average, subjects had more zygomaticus activity when they saw 
happy faces than when they saw neutral faces, t(139) = 2.66, p = .01, 95% CI [.003, .019], 
which also was primarily during the second 500ms, t(139) = 2.77, p = .01, 95% CI [.003, 
.017], and not during the first 500ms, t(142) = 1.07, p = .29, 95% CI [-.001, .004]. Again, on 
average, this difference was smaller for those who saw Meredith get excited about a 
one-week relationship, at least during the second 500ms, but the effect of the videos on 
the difference in zygomaticus activity in response to happy vs. neutral faces was not 
statistically significant either overall, t(139) = 1.21, p = .23, 95% CI [-.027, .006], or during 
the second 500ms, t(139) = 1.12, p = .27, 95% CI [-.022, .006].  
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In summary, the data supported the prediction that subjects would have more 
zygomaticus activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces. 
Although the pattern of the data was consistent with the prediction that the difference 
in zygomaticus activity would be smaller when subjects they saw Meredith get excited 
about a one-week relationship than when they saw her get excited about a two-year 
relationship, the effect of the video was not statistically significant. 
Corrugator. Figure IV.8 displays subjects’ average corrugator activity during the 
first second that they saw the sad, neutral, and happy faces. On average, subjects had 
less corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces, t(141) 
= 6.78, p < .001, 95% CI [-.034, -.018], which occurred during both the first 500ms, t(144) 
= 4.68, p < .001, 95% CI [-.007, -.003], and the second 500ms, t(141) = 6.48, p < .001, 95% 
CI [-.027, -.014]. Furthermore, this difference was smaller for subjects who watched 
Meredith get excited about a one-week relationship than for those who watched her get 
excited about a two-year relationship overall, t(141) = 2.03, p = .04, 95% CI [.0004, .031], 
and during the first 500ms, t(144) = 2.02, p = .045, 95% CI [.0001, .009], and there was a 
similar trend during the second 500ms, t(141) = 1.73, p = .09, 95% CI [-.002, .024].  
Moreover, when subjects saw Meredith’s happy faces, those who watched her 
get excited about a two-year relationship had greater decreases in corrugator activity 
than those who watched her get excited about a one-week relationship during the first 
500ms, t(144) = 2.08, p = .04, 95% CI [.0002, .006], but not during the second 500ms, 
t(141) = .83, p = .41, 95% CI [-.005, .011], whereas there was a trend for them to have 
greater corrugator activity when they saw sad faces during the second 500ms, t(141) = 
1.69, p = .09, 95% CI [-.017, .001], but not during the first 500ms, t(144) = .74, p = .46, 95% 
CI [-.004, .002].  
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Figure IV.8. Average corrugator supercilii activity during the first second that 
subjects saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses 
are based on a procedure from Dimberg and colleagues (e.g., Dimberg & Petterson, 
2000). 
 
On average, there was no difference in corrugator activity when subjects saw sad 
faces and when they saw neutral faces, t(141) = 1.45, p = .15, 95% CI [-.001, .008], though 
there was a trend for more corrugator activity during the second 500ms, t(141) = 1.96, p 
= .052, 95% CI [-.00003, .007]. There was a trend for the difference in corrugator activity 
to sad vs. neutral faces to be smaller for subjects who watched Meredith get excited 
about a one-week relationship than for those who watched her get excited about a two-
year relationship overall, t(141) = 1.75, p = .08, 95% CI [-.017, .001], but not during the 
first 500ms alone, t(144) = 1.03, p = .30, 95% CI [-.006, .002], or during the second 500ms 
alone, t(141) = 1.60, p = .11, 95% CI [-.013, .001]. 
In summary, the data supported the prediction that subjects would have less 
corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces. 
Furthermore, the data supported the prediction that this difference in corrugator 
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activity would be smaller when subjects they saw Meredith get excited about a one-
week relationship than when they saw her get excited about a two-year relationship. 
Analyses Based on Moody and Colleagues 
Zygomaticus. Figure IV.9 displays subjects’ average zygomaticus activity during 
the first second that they saw the happy, neutral, and sad faces. On average, subjects 
had more zygomaticus activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad 
faces, t(139) = 3.21, p = .002, 95% CI [.014, .060], which occurred during the second 
500ms, t(139) = 3.54, p < .001, 95% CI [.014, .051], but not during the first 500ms, t(139) = 
1.20, p = .23, 95% CI [-.003, .012]. Although this difference tended to be smaller for those 
who watched Meredith get excited about a one-week relationship, at least during the 
second 500ms, but the effect of the video on the difference in zygomaticus activity was 
not statistically significant either overall, t(139) = .14 p = .89, 95% CI [-.049, .043], or 
during just the second 500ms, t(139) = .26, p = .80, 95% CI [-.041, .032].  
 
Figure IV.9. Average zygomaticus major activity during the first second that 
subjects saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses 
are based on a procedure from Moody et al. (2007). 
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Additionally, on average, subjects had more zygomaticus activity when they saw 
happy faces than when they saw neutral faces, t(139) = 3.32, p = .001, 95% CI [.014, .057], 
which also was primarily during the second 500ms, t(139) = 3.49, p < .001, 95% CI [.013, 
.047], and not during the first 500ms, t(139) = 1.59, p = .12, 95% CI [-.001, .013]. On 
average, this difference was smaller for subjects who watched Meredith get excited 
about a one-week relationship, but the effect of the video on the difference in 
zygomaticus activity was not statistically significant overall, t(139) = 1.19, p = .24, 95% 
CI [-.068, .017], or during just the second 500ms, t(139) = 1.18, p = .24, 95% CI [-.054, 
.014].  
In summary, the data supported the prediction that subjects would have more 
zygomaticus activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces. 
Although the pattern of the data was consistent with the prediction that the difference 
in zygomaticus activity would be smaller when subjects they saw Meredith get excited 
about a one-week relationship than when they saw her get excited about a two-year 
relationship, the effect of the video was not statistically significant. 
Corrugator. Figure IV.10 displays subjects’ average corrugator activity during 
the first second that they saw the sad, neutral, and happy faces. On average, subjects 
had less corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces, 
t(141) = 9.65, p < .001, 95% CI [-.128, -.085], which occurred during both the first 500ms, 
t(144) = 6.36, p < .001, 95% CI [-.030, -.016], and the second 500ms, t(141) = 9.75, p < .001, 
95% CI [-.101, -.067]. Furthermore, this difference was smaller for subjects who watched 
Meredith get excited about a one-week relationship than for those who watched her get 
excited about a two-year relationship overall, t(141) = 1.99, p = .049, 95% CI [-.087, -
.0002], with a trend for the effect during the second 500ms, t(141) = 1.93, p = .056, 95% CI 
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[-.067, .001], and no effect during the first 500ms, t(144) = 1.50, p = .14, 95% CI [-.024, 
.003]. 
 
Figure IV.10. Average corrugator supercilii activity during the first second that subjects 
saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses are 
based on a procedure from Moody et al. (2007). 
 
Moreover, when subjects saw Meredith’s happy faces, those who watched her 
get excited about a two-year relationship had a trend for greater decreases in corrugator 
activity than those who watched her get excited about a one-week relationship during 
the first 500ms, t(141) = 1.78, p = .08, 95% CI [-.001, .021], but not during the second 
500ms, t(141) = 1.41, p = .16, 95% CI [-.008, .046], whereas when they saw her sad faces, 
there were no differences in corrugator activity during the first 500ms, t(141) = .15, p = 
.88, 95% CI [-.012, .010], or the second 500ms, t(141) = 1.36, p = .17, 95% CI [-.034, .006].  
On average, there was no difference in corrugator activity when subjects saw sad 
faces and when they saw neutral faces overall, t(141) = 1.40, p = .16, 95% CI [-.052, 
.0004], though they did have more corrugator activity when they saw sad faces during 
the second 500ms, t(141) = 2.18, p = .03, 95% CI [.001, .020], and this difference was 
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smaller for those who watched Meredith get excited about a one-week relationship, 
t(141) = 2.08, p = .04, 95% CI [-.039, -.001]. 
In summary, the data supported the prediction that subjects would have less 
corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces. 
Furthermore, the data supported the prediction that this difference in corrugator 
activity would be smaller when subjects they saw Meredith get excited about a one-
week relationship than when they saw her get excited about a two-year relationship. 
Analyses Based on Bourgeois and Hess 
Zygomaticus. Figure IV.11 displays subjects’ average zygomaticus activity when 
they saw happy, neutral, and sad faces. On average, subjects had more zygomaticus 
activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces, t(139) = 4.08, p < 
.001, 95% CI [.067, .192], or when they saw neutral faces, t(139) = 3.14, p = .002, 95% CI 
[.037, .165]. Although these differences were smaller on average for subjects who saw 
Meredith get excited about a one-week relationship than for those who saw her get 
excited about a two-year relationship, the effect of the video was not statistically 
significant for happy vs. sad faces, t(139) = .83, p = .41, 95% CI [-.178, .073], or for happy 
vs. neutral faces, t(139) = .29, p = .77, 95% CI [-.146, .109].  
These data supported the prediction that subjects would have more zygomaticus 
activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces. Although the pattern 
of the data was consistent with the prediction that this difference would be smaller 
when they saw Meredith get excited about a one-week relationship, the effect of the 
video was not statistically significant. 
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Figure IV.11. Average zygomaticus major activity during the entire period that subjects 
saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses are 
based on a procedure from Bourgeois & Hess (2008). 
 
Corrugator. Figure IV.12 displays subjects’ average corrugator activity when 
they saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. On average, subjects had less corrugator 
activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces, t(141) = 10.88, p < 
.001, 95% CI [-.443, -.307], and more corrugator activity when they saw sad faces than 
when they saw neutral faces, t(141) = 3.04, p = .003, 95% CI [.029, .137]. As in the 
previous analyses, on average these differences were smaller for subjects who saw 
Meredith get excited about a one-week relationship than for those who saw her get 
excited about a two-year relationship, but the effect of the video was not significant for 
happy vs. sad faces, t(141) = .70, p = .49, 95% CI [-.088, .184], or for sad vs. neutral faces, 
t(141) = 1.00, p = .32, 95% CI [-.053, .162].  
These data supported the prediction that subjects would have less corrugator 
activity when they saw happy faces than when they saw sad faces, but not the 
prediction that this difference would be smaller when they saw Meredith get excited 
about a one-week relationship. 
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Figure IV.12. Average corrugator supercilii activity during the entire period that subjects 
saw sad, neutral, and happy faces. The bars depict ±1 standard error. Analyses are 
based on a procedure from Bourgeois & Hess (2008). 
 
Summary of EMG Results 
The results of the study supported the prediction that subjects would have more 
zygomaticus activity and less corrugator activity when they saw happy faces than when 
they saw sad faces. This is the typical “mimicry” effect that has been found in past 
research. All three methods of analysis found these differences in facial muscle activity 
in response to the emotional faces. Moreover, the differences in facial muscle activity 
seemed to emerge primarily after 500ms, as has been found in previous research (e.g., 
Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; Dimberg et al., 2000). 
In addition, the results supported the backtracking hypothesis, albeit 
imperfectly. I predicted that subjects’ facial reactions to the emotional faces would be 
smaller when they saw Meredith get excited about a one-week relationship than when 
they saw her get excited about a two-year relationship. The pattern of the data was 
consistent with this hypothesis for both the corrugator and the zygomaticus, though the 
effect of the video was only significant for the corrugator.  
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For the corrugator, the methods of analysis from Dimberg and colleagues and 
from Moody and colleagues both found that when subjects saw happy vs. sad faces, the 
difference in corrugator activity was smaller when they saw Meredith get excited about 
a one-week relationship than when they saw her get excited about a two-year 
relationship. Furthermore, this was primarily due to smaller decreases in corrugator 
activity when subjects saw her happy faces. This relaxation of the corrugator is 
commonly found in studies of mimicry when subjects see happy faces (e.g., Dimberg & 
Petterson, 2000; Dimberg & Thunberg, 2012; Dimberg et al., 2000). The method of 
analysis from Bourgeois and Hess found the same pattern of results, though it was not 
significant. This is not surprising, considering that this method examined muscle 
activity during the entire eight seconds that subjects saw the faces, whereas the other 
two methods capture more immediate facial responses during the first second. 
For the zygomaticus, although all three methods of analysis found that when 
subjects saw happy vs. sad faces, the difference in zygomaticus activity was smaller on 
average when they saw Meredith get excited about a one-week relationship, the 
difference was not significant. In both the pilot study and the full study, differences in 
zygomaticus activity were harder to detect, perhaps because there was more noise in 
the zygomaticus data, a point which I will return to in the discussion. 
Self-Reported Emotions 
 After completing the emotion perception task, subjects reported how happy 
(average of “happy” and “cheerful”), amused (average of “amused” and “entertained”), 
irritated (average of “irritated” and “annoyed”), and jealous (average of “jealous” and 
“envious”) they felt while they were watching the video at the beginning of the study. 
There was no difference in how happy subjects reported feeling when they watched 
Meredith get excited about a two-year relationship (M = 69.21, SD = 23.53) or a one-
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week relationship (M = 64.85, SD = 23.82), t(139.98) = 1.10, p = .27, 95% CI [-3.50, 12.21]. 
Although a couple of subjects laughed when they were watching the one-week video, 
on average there was no difference in how amused subjects reported feeling in the two-
year condition (M = 58.13, SD = 21.50) and one-week condition (M = 63.74, SD = 21.15), 
t(147.96) = 1.61, p = .11, 95% CI [-12.49, 1.27]. However, subjects reported feeling more 
irritated in the one-week condition (M = 25.01, SD = 26.58) than in the two-years 
condition (M = 14.95, SD = 19.07), t(134.32) = 2.66, p = .01, 95% CI [-17.55, -2.57], whereas 
they reported feeling more jealous in the two-years condition (M = 38.69, SD = 28.95) 
than in the one-week condition (M = 25.43, SD = 27.45), t(144.35) = 2.85, p = .01, 95% CI 
[4.07, 22.47]. 
Discussion 
 Seeing someone express an emotion can make an observer express a similar 
emotion. One explanation that has been offered for this phenomenon is stimulus-driven 
mimicry, where the presence of the other’s emotion expression automatically causes the 
observer to make the same expression. In this study, I tested another possibility, 
backtracking, where observers make sense of what caused another’s emotion 
expression, and they make an appraisal. If the observer sees someone smile and 
appraises that something good happened, the observer will smile back, and if the 
observer sees the smile and appraises that something more trivial happened, the 
observer will smile back less.  
 The present study replicated the typical findings in studies of mimicry. When 
subjects saw someone with a happy face vs. a sad face, they had more activity in the 
zygomaticus major, the muscle that pulls the lips back in a smile, and less activity in the 
corrugator supercilii, the muscle that pulls the eyebrows together in a frown. If the 
facial responses were simply mimicry, that would be the end of the story. But in 
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support of the backtracking hypothesis, these differences were smaller when subjects 
thought the other person could get excited about something trivial like a one-week 
romantic relationship, and therefore, they had reason to distrust that her smiles meant 
something truly good happened to her. 
 The effect of the relationship length on subjects’ muscle activity was stronger for 
the corrugator. In research on facial mimicry, it’s not uncommon to see large decreases 
in corrugator activity when happy faces appear rather than increases in corrugator 
activity when negative faces appear (e.g., Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; Dimberg & 
Thunberg, 2012; Dimberg et al., 2000). This can happen when subjects are concentrating 
as they prepare for the face to appear, because the corrugator is active not only during 
expressions of sadness, anger, and fear, but also during expressions of concentration or 
mental effort (Hess, Philippot, & Blairy, 1998; C. A. Smith, 1989). When a happy face 
appears, they relax the brow and contract the cheeks.  
 The effect of relationship length on zygomaticus activity was in the predicted 
direction, but it was not significant. This might have been due to a smaller signal-to-
noise ratio in the zygomaticus data. During the study, subjects were surreptitiously 
video-recorded so behavioral artifacts that were unrelated to the phenomenon of 
interest could be coded and excluded from analyses. Indeed, in the videos of the 
subjects, it was easy to see that they often moved their mouths in ways that were 
unrelated to smiling or mimicry. They bit and smacked their lips, pressed their lips 
together, and yawned, all of which added noise to the zygomaticus, but not to the 
corrugator. Attempts were made to code these behaviors to reduce their influence on 
the data, but the coding might not have done enough, and the sample size might have 
been too small to detect the signal. In the mimicry pilot study, there was more activity 
in the corrugator when subjects saw sad faces, but not more activity in the zygomaticus 
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when they saw happy faces; in the main study, with a larger sample, the difference in 
zygomaticus activity appeared. In the main study, relationship length affected activity 
in the corrugator, but not activity in the zygomaticus; perhaps with a larger sample, the 
effect of relationship length on the zygomaticus would also have appeared. 
 There was no difference in subjects’ self-reports of how happy they felt as they 
watched the videos. These results are at odds with two other studies, not reported here, 
that used the same videos and found that subjects felt much less happy for Meredith 
when she was in a one-week relationship than when she is in a two-year relationship. 
The self-reports in the present study might be less reliable because they were collected 
at the end of the study, about 8-10 minutes after subjects watched the videos, and after 
they participated in another task. Nevertheless, there was some evidence that subjects 
found her situation less emotionally compelling when she was in a one-week 
relationship. They felt more irritated, perhaps because she was overly excited, and less 
jealous, because there was nothing to be jealous of.  
 The analysis of EMG data can be inconsistent between labs and studies. I 
analyzed the data from the present study using three procedures from different labs. 
Although these procedures showed the same general pattern, there were differences, 
most notably when comparing the methods that focused on muscle activity during the 
first second to the method that focused on muscle activity during the entire eight 
seconds. Specifically, the procedure that used the entire period was less likely to find 
significant results. Theoretically, stimulus-driven mimicry should occur quickly, and so 
facial activity during the first second of exposure should be more important than 
activity occurring later, when subjects might inhibit their facial responses, make other 
expressions, or simply stop paying attention to the emotional faces. Importantly, the 
experimental condition had the biggest effect during this early period, which supports 
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the notion that backtracking can occur rapidly and modify early facial responses to 
emotional faces. 
 The focus of the present study was backtracking, but other researchers have 
offered ways that emotion expressions can influence an observer’s affective response. In 
social referencing, children look to their parents’ emotion expressions to decide whether 
it is safe to cross a visual cliff (Klinnert, Emde, Butterfield, & Campos, 1986; Mumme, 
Fernald, & Herrera, 1996). In social appraisal theory, which generalizes social 
referencing to adults, people use others’ emotion expressions to inform appraisals of 
their own situations (Parkinson, 2011; Parkinson, Phiri, & Simons, 2012). Others have 
argued that emotion mimicry depends on the meaning of others’ emotion expressions 
for affiliation (Hess & Fischer, 2013, 2014). But the backtracking hypothesis emphasizes 
vicarious emotions, and that mimicry is not the only way that emotion expressions can 
influence an observer’s vicarious emotions. Instead, subjects can use the expression to 
infer what kind of situation must have caused it, which is enough for them to at least 
appraise it as good or bad. 
 The backtracking hypothesis is rooted in an appraisal theory of empathy and 
other vicarious emotions (Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015). According to the theory, if an 
observer appraises someone else’s emotional situation, the observer will feel a vicarious 
emotion for the other person. The results of the present research suggest that the 
observer doesn’t need to know all the details of the situation to empathize. Instead, as 
Adam Smith suggested, observers can use others’ emotion expressions to infer whether 
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This work introduced an appraisal theory of empathy and other vicarious 
emotional experiences. According to the theory, empathy is caused by an observer’s 
appraisal of a target’s situation. The observer appraises the target’s situation along the 
same dimensions that have been identified in appraisal theories of emotion. If the 
observer appraises the target’s situation similarly to how the target appraises it, then 
the two will feel similar emotions and the observer will experience what we call 
empathy. If the observer appraises the target’s situation differently from how the target 
appraises it, then the observer will feel a different emotion, or will feel relatively 
unemotional.  
In Chapter II, I described the appraisal theory of empathy and how it addresses 
limitations of other theories. The greatest benefits of the theory are its parsimony—that 
it accounts for empathy with normal emotional processes rather than with special 
explanations—and its ability to explain phenomena that are not explained well by other 
theories, most notably how people can feel vicarious emotions that others do not feel.  
In Chapter III, I presented the first empirical research that tested the theory. In 
this research, I tested the hypothesis that changing an observer’s appraisal of a target’s 
situation could make the observer feel a vicarious emotion that the target did not feel. I 
found that changing subjects’ appraisals of other-agency made them feel vicarious 
anger that the target did not feel.  
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In Chapter IV, I tested whether a specific kind of vicarious emotional behavior, 
emotional facial mimicry, is at least partially due to observers’ beliefs that others’ 
emotion expressions signal that something good or bad happened. If so, then empirical 
results that have typically been attributed to emotion-matching processes, such as 
mimicry, might be alternatively explained by appraisal theory. I found that when a 
target’s happy expression was not a reliable sign that something good happened, 
subjects “mimicked” the target’s expressions less.  
These studies provide initial support for the appraisal theory of empathy and 
other vicarious emotional experiences. The core idea of the appraisal theory of vicarious 
emotions is that people feel emotions for others when they appraise their situation, 
using the same appraisal criteria that have been found to be important in firsthand 
emotions. Figure V.1 displays a model of the appraisal theory. An observer who attends 
to a target’s emotional experience uses cues from the target’s situation and emotion 
expression to appraise the target’s situation, and the observer’s appraisal determines 
how the observer feels for the target. The research from Chapter III tested the appraisal 
theory by changing cues from the target’s situation to alter subjects’ appraisals, whereas 
the research from Chapter IV tested the theory by changing how subjects used cues 
from the emotion expression to inform their appraisals. 
 
Figure V.1. Model of the appraisal theory of vicarious emotions. 
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I will conclude this work by offering some directions for future research.  
Directions for Future Research 
 The appraisal theory offers many directions for empathy research by shifting the 
focus from the target’s emotion to the target’s situation. Here are three that should take 
high priority.  
Testing the Theory with Other Appraisals 
 Chapter III explicitly tested how changing appraisals of agency for another’s 
misfortune could lead an observer to feel vicarious anger, but there are more appraisals 
to be tested. In other research, I have found that changing appraisals of pleasantness, so 
that someone else’s emotional situation is more pleasant or unpleasant, can increase 
vicarious positive and negative emotions. Future research could examine whether 
changing appraisals of controllability, so that someone else’s misfortune seems 
uncontrollable, can increase vicarious sadness and sympathy. There is some evidence 
that changing the target of empathy, so that they seem more vulnerable (e.g., they have 
more childlike features), can increase feelings of sympathy (Dijker, 2001; Lishner, 
Batson, & Huss, 2011). This might be because when someone seems vulnerable, 
observers tend to think they lack control across many different situations. Sympathy 
might also increase when someone does not seem vulnerable in general, but who seems 
to lack control in a specific situation. Additionally, future research could examine 
whether changing appraisals of certainty distinguishes vicarious sadness from vicarious 
fear (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). 
Testing the Different States Hypothesis in the Same Situation 
 In Chapter II, I offered two broad hypotheses about how observers’ appraisals 
might lead them to feel a vicarious emotion that the target does not feel. The first was 
the different information hypothesis, where the observer knows something about the 
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target’s situation that the target doesn’t know, or the target knows something the 
observer doesn’t know; this hypothesis was tested in Chapter III, where subjects felt 
vicarious anger when they knew that the target’s friend had sabotaged him, but the 
target didn’t know this. The second was the different states hypothesis, where the 
observer and target have access to the same information, but they appraise it differently 
due to differences in their psychological states. In some sense, this hypothesis was 
tested in Chapter IV, where the woman in the video seemed to think a one-week 
relationship was wonderful, but subjects thought it was trivial. 
 In both studies, subjects’ appraisals were manipulated by changing the targets’ 
situations, and not by changing their perceptions of the same situations. This makes the 
present research like most studies of appraisal and emotion, where subjects are asked to 
recall different situations and report their emotions and appraisals (e.g., Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), or where their situations are experimentally changed in ways that 
target specific appraisals (e.g. Gentsch, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2015). But appraisal 
theory predicts that when people make different appraisals of the same situations, they 
will feel different emotions. Thus, the different states hypothesis predicts that observers 
would feel different vicarious emotions if their psychological states lead them to 
appraise a target’s situation differently, even if that situation stays the same.  
Appraisals must rely on whatever information is accessible in the moment, 
whether it is cues from the situation, cues from one’s past experiences, cues from the 
target’s emotion expression, or something else. Insights from social cognition, and 
judgment and decision-making, could be used to manipulate how subjects use 
accessible information to appraise the situation. This should have consequences for 
their vicarious emotions. For example, judgments of self-efficacy are subject to 
anchoring (Cervone & Peake, 1986) and the ease with which one can come up with 
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factors that help or hinder performance (Cervone, 1989). Similarly, appraisals of 
someone else’s misfortune might be manipulated by changing the ease with which 
observers can come up with factors that place the situation in or out of the target’s 
control, which should have consequences for their vicarious emotions. 
How Do Observers Integrate the Emotion Expression and the Situation? 
 One understudied area in empathy research is how observers integrate different 
cues from the target’s emotion expression and the target’s situation to empathize. 
Although this topic has received attention in research on emotion perception (e.g., 
Carroll & Russell, 1996; Munn, 1940), it has received little empirical attention in research 
on how observers actually feel emotions for others, which is how I have defined 
empathy in the present work. In most studies of empathy, the expression and situation 
communicate similar information. The targets of empathy are emotional about things 
that most people agree are good or bad, such as getting engaged (Morelli, Rameson, & 
Lieberman, 2014), or their parents dying (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978). Chapter IV 
found evidence that when the target’s emotion expression is excessive, it can reduce the 
observer’s vicarious response. But what if the target’s emotion expression is too weak? 
For example, how would an observer react to a target who seemed only mildly upset 
about his mother dying? Would the observer feel sad because the situation seems 
severe? Would the observer use the target’s expression to reappraise the situation, and 
perhaps assume that the target was estranged from his mother, so it’s not as bad? Or 
would the observer get mad at the target for caring too little about something so 
serious? How observers integrate cues from the expression and situation to empathize 
is a question that is ripe for future research. 
Conclusion 
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 This work introduced an appraisal theory of empathy and other vicarious 
emotional experiences, where an observer feels an emotion for a target when the 
observer appraises the target’s situation. If the observer appraises the situation the same 
way the target appraises it, then the observe will feel the same emotion as the target and 
experience what we call empathy. If the observer appraises the situation differently, 
then the observer will feel some other vicarious emotion, or will feel relatively 
unemotional. According to the theory, the proximate cause of vicarious emotions is the 
observer’s appraisal of the target’s situation, not the observer’s perception of the 
target’s emotions. The theory explains vicarious emotions with the same appraisal 
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